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THE VALUE OF CONFRONTATION AS A FELONY
SENTENCING RIGHT
Shaakirrah R. Sanders*
ABSTRACT

This Article advocates recognition of the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause as a felony sentencing right. In the modern
U.S. criminaljustice system, the adversarialprocess does not end
once a plea or verdict of guilt is rendered. Fact-finding at felony
sentencing hearingsis as quantitativelyvital asfact-findingat trials.
Yet, sentencing courts continue to exercise discretion to increase
punishment based on multiple categories of unproven criminal
conduct. The denial of an opportunity to cross-examine this type of
evidence undermines the core principle that those accused offelony
crimes have the right to confront adversarialwitnesses.
Williams v. New York, the most historic case on the issue of
confrontation rights at felony sentencing, held that crossexamination was not required to test the veracity of information
presented at sentencing hearings. Williams was decided before
incorporation of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause.
Williams also reflects a sentencing model that assumes judicial
authority to consider un-cross-examinedtestimonyfor purposes of
fixing the punishment. This assumption may be unwarrantedin light
of recent jurisprudence on criminal procedure rights at felony
sentencing.

*Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law. B.S.,
Trinity College (Hartford, Connecticut); J.D., Loyola University New Orleans
College of Law. I thank the Widener Law Journal and its faculty advisor,
Professor Tonya Evans, for the invitation to participate in this symposium. For
their helpful critic of this work, this author would also like to thank the ABA
Criminal Justice Section, the AALS Criminal Justice Section, Melissa Hamilton,
Visiting Criminal Law Scholar at the University of Houston Law Center, Corinna
Lain, Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Professor of Law at the
University of Richmond School of Law, and Meghan Ryan, Associate Professor
Law at Southern Methodist University Dedman School of law.
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Williams constitutes the beginning of the debate on the issue of
confrontation rights at felony sentencing, not the conclusion. The
standardthat appliedto confrontationrights at the time of Williams
has been reformed More recent jurisprudence establishes that
where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of
reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is
confrontation. While this jurisprudence has only been applied
duringthe trial, it can be practicallyand efficiently appliedatfelony
sentencing.
The Sixth Amendment's other clauses give reason to look
beyond Williams. The structurally identicalJury Trial and Counsel
Clauses have rejected the "trial-right-only" approach to Sixth
Amendment rights. The Counsel Clause applies to all "critical
stages" of the "criminalprosecution" which includes sentencing.
The Court recently expanded the Jury Trial Clause to any fact that
increasedthe statutory maximum or minimum punishment. In light
of this jurisprudence and the growing importance of sentencing
hearings, aframework should be establishedto distinguish between
sentencing evidence that should be cross-examinedand sentencing
evidence that should not be cross-examined.
This Article advocates constitutionalrecognition of a right to
confront felony sentencing evidence and provides a paradigmfor
doing so. PartI of this Article explains Williams and demonstrates
how recent interpretations of confrontation rights at trial should
now inform the issue of confrontation atfelony sentencing. PartII
of this Article explains the development of sentencing rights with
regards to the Counsel and Jury Trial Clauses. Part III exposes
Williams as a reflection ofthe indeterminatesentencing model. This
Article concludes that confrontation should apply to evidence that
is material to punishment and where cross-examinationwill assist
in assessing truth and veracity.
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INTRODUCTION

The issue of confrontation rights at felony sentencing has long
been debated. The most significant Supreme Court decision on this
issue is Williams v. New York.1 In this infamous case, the Court held
that cross-examination was not required to test the veracity of
information presented at sentencing hearings. 2 From Williams
emerged the philosophy that trial judges have always enjoyed broad
discretion to consider un-cross-examined evidence when fixing
punishment. This Article questions this philosophy and offers
several arguments in favor of reevaluating Williams. First, Williams
incorrectly assumed that founding-era sentencing judges exercised
discretion to consider un-cross-examined testimony for purposes of
fixing felony punishment. Second, the structurally identical Jury
Trial and Counsel Clauses long ago rejected the "trial-right-only"
approach to Sixth Amendment rights. Third, the Court's decision in
Crawford v. Washington3 casts doubt on whether Williams still
controls the issue of confrontation rights at felony sentencing.
Finally, confrontation principles can be practically and efficiently
applied during this stage of the criminal prosecution.
Perhaps in 1949 the Williams Court got it right, that crossexamination was not required of statements presented against felony
defendants for the first time at sentencing. However, Williams
should not preclude a reconsideration of constitutional rules that
apply to modem felony sentencing hearings. Williams arose in a
world where indeterminate sentencing was at its height, criminal

' 337 U.S. 241 (1949).

2 Id. at 249-51.

3 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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trials were more common for felony cases,4 and most constitutional
rules of criminal procedure did not apply in state courts.
Additionally, the shared reliability standard between confrontation
and due process 5 made it less likely that a contrary ruling in
Williams would have yielded a different result for most felony
defendants.
Today, the modem U.S. criminal justice system verges "on an
assembly line." 6 In the current system of plea-bargaining and
sentencing, the vast majority of felony defendants do not test the
veracity of testimonial statements used against them at the
sentencing hearing.7 While Justice Kennedy instructs that "[t]o note
the prevalence of plea bargaining is not to criticize it,"' it cannot be
ignored that in this modem system, the adversarial process does not
end once a verdict or plea of guilt is rendered. For most felony
defendants, the adversarial process begins at sentencing. There is
no conclusive empirical evidence that judges are more reliable fact
finders, 9 and recent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence gives
reason to reconsider Williams and the value of confrontation at
felony sentencing.' 0
Testing the veracity of testimonial statements that are material
to punishment is as compelling at felony sentencing as at trial.
Felony sentencing courts have discretion to increase punishment

4See Jennifer

L. Mnookin, UncertainBargains:The Rise ofPleaBargaining

in America, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1721, 1721 (2005) (describing the occurrence of
criminal trials in the modem U.S. justice system as "rare as the spotted owl").
'See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
6 Jeffrey L. Fisher, Originalism as an Anchor for the Sixth Amendment, 34
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 53, 62 (2011). Fisher served as defense counsel in
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and Crawford v. Washington, 541

U.S. 36 (2004). Id.

&

' Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) ("Ninety-seven percent of
federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of
guilty pleas.") (citation omitted).
8
Id.
'See Eang Ngov, JudicialNullification ofJuries: Use ofAcquitted Conduct
at Sentencing, 76 TENN. L. REv. 235, 281-83 (2009) (discussing the inherent
fallibility of judges as fact-finders).
"o See generally, Shaakirrah R. Sanders, Making the Right Call for
Confrontation at Felony Sentencing, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791 (2014)
Shaakirrah R. Sanders, Unbranding Confrontation as Only a Trial Right, 65

HASTINGS L.J. 1257 (2014).
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based on un-cross-examined testimonial statements about several
categories of unproven criminal conduct." Thus, findings of fact
made at sentencing are as qualitatively vital as findings of fact made
at trial. 12 Due to the current system of plea bargaining,1 3 a vast
majority of felony convictions are the result of a guilty plea. Such
pleas typically do not afford criminal defendants an opportunity to
test the veracity of testimonial statements made against them prior
to the sentencing hearing. As such, the fundamental right to crossexamine a witness is unavailable at one of the most critical stages of
the criminal prosecution: the sentencing hearing. 14
Other changes in the U.S. criminal justice system also support
the application of confrontation rights at felony sentencing. In the
past, neither the Counsel nor the Jury Trial Clauses automatically
applied at felony sentencing." Gideon v. Wainwright eventually
applied the Counsel Clause to all "critical stages" of the "criminal
prosecution," 1 6 which was ultimately deemed, in Mempa v. Rhay, to
include sentencing hearings.' 7 McMillan v. Pennsylvania initially
established that the Jury Trial Clause only applied to "elements" of
" Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 583-84 (1959) (affirming Williams
v. New York and holding that a sentencing judge is not restricted to evidence
presented at trial for purposes fixing punishment). But see Specht v. Patterson,
386 U.S. 605, 607-11 (1967) (holding that a defendant may not be convicted under
one statute that authorizes a maximum sentence of 10 years, but sentenced for an
indeterminate term under another statute). See also Ngov, supra note 9, at 28183.
12 Edward Becker, InsuringReliable FactFindingin GuidelinesSentencing:
Must the Guaranteesof the Confrontation and Due Process Clauses Be Applied,
151 F.R.D. 153, 158 (1993) (describing guidelines sentencing procedures).
13 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (citation omitted).
14 Becker, supra note 12, at 164-65. See also Douglas A. Berman,
ConceptualizingBooker, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 391 (2006).
'1 Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 487, 520-21 (2009) (discussing the Court's interpretation of "criminal
prosecution" among various Sixth Amendment rights); See also Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963) (applying the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,403-08 (1965) (applying the Confrontation Clause
against the states); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (applying the
Jury Trial Clause against the states).
16 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963).
1 389 U.S. 128, 136 (1967).
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the offense, not to "enhancements" to the punishment.'s The
distinction proved significant because while elements must be
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, enhancements
need only be proven to a judge by a preponderance of the evidence
during sentencing. 19 Apprendi v. New Jersey radically changed the
trial "element" versus sentencing "enhancement" distinction and
applied the Jury Trial Clause to any fact that increased the statutory
maximum punishment. 20 Recently, Alleyne v. United States
expanded the scope of Apprendi to include the statutory minimum
punishment.21
This Article advocates reexamining the theory that
confrontation rights only apply at trial. The Counsel, Confrontation,
and Jury Trial Clauses are structurally identical and appear to apply
in a broad sense "[i]n all criminal prosecutions." 22 Each has been
deemed essential to our system of criminal prosecutions, 2 3 but in the
past it was generally well accepted that the Confrontation Clause
only "reflect[ed] a preference for face-to-face confrontation at
trial." 24 The close link that previously existed between the
Confrontation Clause and due process-based hearsay ruleS 25 led
lower courts to rule that confrontation and hearsay were of the same
origin (due process) and designed to protect similar values

18 477 U.S. 79, 82-86 (1986).
19 Id.

530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000).
133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013).
22 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
23 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343-45 (deeming the assistance of counsel
a
fundamental right in state and federal prosecutions); Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404
(holding confrontation "a fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a criminal
prosecution"); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 (holding the "trial by jury in criminal
cases ... fundamental to the American scheme of justice").
24 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980) (deeming face-to-face
confrontation only a preference), abrogatedby Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36 (2004) (emphasis added).
25 United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1102-03 (3d Cir. 1990),
overruled by United States v. Grier, 449 F.3d 558 (2006) (reasoning that because
hearsay was normally considered at sentencing, a confrontation violation occured
only when a court's reliance on misinformation was of a constitutional
magnitude). See also Chhablani,supra note 15, at 498-99 (discussing the Burger
Court's reading of confrontation rights to require a showing of reliability).
20

21
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(trustworthiness and reliability). 26 But the Court's re-examination

of the historical origin and text of the Confrontation Clause in
Crawford v. Washington established that "[w]here testimonial
statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to
satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually
27
prescribes: confrontation."
This Article proposes uniform application of the Sixth
Amendment's Counsel, Jury Trial, and Confrontation Clauses at
felony sentencing. In Part I of this Article, I examine Williams and
discuss the pre-incorporation rejection that felony defendants cannot
cross-examine information contained in a probation report that is
presented for the first time at sentencing. Part I explains why the
Court's recent interpretations of the Confrontation Clause control
the issue of whether cross-examination should be allowed at felony
sentencing. Part I concludes that Williams was a reflection of the
post-founding shift from a determinate to an indeterminate
sentencing model, the latter of which was at its height when
Williams was decided. Part II of this Article discusses the Sixth
Amendment's text and structure, and the pre-founding model of
determinate sentencing. Part II also explains the origin of the trialright-only rule and discusses the Counsel Clause's early rejection of
the theory. Part II further discusses the erosion of the trial-rightonly theory of the Counsel and Jury Trial Clauses and advocates for
uniform application of the Sixth Amendment at felony sentencing.
Part III offers a framework for reforming confrontation rights at
felony sentencing. Part III concludes that confrontation rights
should apply where testimonial statements are material to
punishment and where cross-examination will assist the fact-finder
in assessing truth and veracity of such testimonial statements.

26 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (it is a "truism that 'hearsay rules and the
Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values . . and
stem from the same roots"') (internal citations and quotations omitted). See also
G. Michael Fenner, Today's ConfrontationClause (After CrawfordandMelendezDiaz), 43 CREIGHTON L. REv. 35, 37-38 (2009) (noting the shared standard
between confrontation and hearsay rules prior to Crawford).
27 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (holding that the right of confrontation "reflects
a judgment. . . about how reliability can be best determined").
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THE VALUE OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT'S CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE

The scope of the Sixth Amendment right to confront adversarial
witnesses in a "criminal prosecution" has long been debated. Three
years after ratification of the Amendment, a North Carolina court of
equity, in State v. Webb, 28 expressed one of the earliest
interpretations of the confrontation right: "it is a rule of the common
law, founded on natural justice, that no man shall be prejudicedby
evidence which he had not the liberty to cross examine." 29 Over the
next century, state and federal courts retreated from Webb and
confrontation became linked with due process-based hearsay
rules. 30 By the late twentieth century, confrontation and hearsay
rules were generally thought to arise from the same due process
origins and serve the same purposes of trustworthiness and

'

reliability. 3

The most significant Supreme Court decision on the issue of
confrontation rights at felony sentencing is Williams v. New York,3 2
which was decided almost 150 years after ratification of the Sixth
Amendment. Williams held that cross-examination was not required
to test the veracity of information presented at sentencing
hearings. 33 From Williams emerged the philosophy that trial judges
have always enjoyed broad discretion to consider un-crossexamined evidence when fixing punishment.

N.C. 103 (1794).
Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
30 Compare Johnston v. State, 10 Tenn. 58, 59-60 (1821) (reading of
deposition testimony into evidence did not violate confrontation principles
because the witness died before trial), and Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,
239-44 (1895) (for purposes of hearsay exception deceased witness sufficiently
unavailable for trial), with Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 471-75 (1900)
(due to an insufficient showing of unavailability admission at trial of preliminary
hearing testimony violated the Confrontation Clause); see generally Goldsby v.
United States, 160 U.S. 70, 73 (1895) (a confrontation violation did not result
from the failure to conduct a preliminary examination of the accused).
" Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (espousing common roots and similar purposes of
hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause) (internal citations and quotations
omitted); see also Fenner, supra note 26, at 37.
32 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
33
Id. at 249-51.
282
29
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Williams involved the April 20, 1947 murder of fifteen-yearold Selma Graff, who was fatally bludgeoned by a bedroom intruder
in her family's East Flatbush apartment located in Brooklyn, New
York.3 4 In the months after the murder, East Flatbush was placed
under surveillance due to a series of burglaries that plagued the
neighborhood.3 5 At approximately 2:30 a.m. on September 8, 1947,
Samuel Tito Williams was taken into custody for suspicion of
burglary. 36 Williams was an eighteen-year-old African-American
male with a history of trouble with law enforcement, but no prior
convictions.3 7 By most accounts, Williams had difficulty walking
due to a rheumatic fever that weakened his heart and caused swelling
in his legs.3 8 According to one detective, Williams fit the description
of the murderer provided by Graffs nine-year-old brother Donald,
who was also injured in the attack.3 9
Williams orally confessed to Graffs murder on the evening of
September 8, 1947, after eighteen continuous hours of

34 United States ex rel. Williams v. Fay, 211 F. Supp. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y.
1962). Graff was awaken when the murderer "entered the premises and began to
rifle in the contents of a dresser." Id.
35 Id.

36 Williams, 323 F.2d at 66. According to detectives, up to that point no
evidence indicated that Williams was anything but a burglar. 8 Receive Reward
in Solving Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1947, at 28.
37 Id., see also Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 34, at 7.
3 Williams, 323 F.2d at 66.
3 8 Receive Reward in Solving Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1947, at 28.
But see Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 34, at 43. Detectives had dubbed
Graffs murderer the "giggling killer" and maintained that Williams appeared
nervous and was inclined to simper or giggle. 8 Receive Reward in Solving
Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1947, at 28. Detectives also noted that the killer
dropped a green flashlight upon fleeing the scene of the murder. Id. According
to detectives, Williams confessed to being the owner of the flashlight, as well as
other items found at the scene of other burglaries. Id. See also Brief for RelatorAppellant, supra note 34, at 6. Shortly after Graffs murder, the killer was
described as "a white man" and evidence suggests that the police were generally
looking for a Caucasian male. Id. at 6-7. At least one news agency reported that
Donald, the sole witness of the murder, described the killer as a slender and tall
Negro youth. 8 Receive Reward in Solving Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1947,
at 28. But see Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 34, at 43.
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interrogation.4 0 During the first sixteen hours, detectives were
authorized to only ask about the burglaries for which Williams had
been arrested. 4 1 At some point, detectives stopped the interrogation
and took Williams to the scene of several suspected burglaries in the
hope that a witness could identify Williams as the perpetrator. 42 it
is unclear whether anyone was able to do so. After Williams
confessed, the District Attorney conducted a stenographicallyrecorded question and answer session that began at approximately
12:45 a.m. on the morning of September 9, 1947 and was attended
by members of the press.43 Later that morning, between 6:00 a.m.
and 8:00 a.m., Williams was booked for murder and taken to felony

Williams, 323 F.2d at 66; United States ex rel. Williams v. Fay, 211 F.
Supp. 359, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); see also Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note
34, at 14-16. Detectives promised Williams that upon his confession he could see
a chaplain and his mother, the latter whom he had asked for multiple times during
the interrogation. Williams, 323 F.2d at 66; see also Brief for Relator-Appellant,
supranote 34, at 16-17. Detectives reported to the media that Williams indicated
that in the hours before the murder he drank "Sneaky Pete," a tonic concocted of
raw whisky and wine, and that Williams burglarized the Graffs home because he
needed money to buy more of the beverage. 8 Receive Reward in Solving Murder,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1947, at 28.
41 Williams, 323 F.2d at 66; Williams, 211 F. Supp. at 361; see also Brief for
Relator-Appellant, supra note 34, at 14.
42 Williams, 211 F. Supp. at 361-62; see also Brief for Relator-Appellant,
supra note 34, at 14.
43 Williams, 323 F.2d at 66-67; Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 34,
at 17-18 (describing procedures used and questions asked during the recorded
session). After Williams gave both the oral and written confessions, the District
Attorney was summoned by law enforcement. Id. The recorded session ended at
3:00 a.m.-over twenty-four hours after Williams's arrest. Id. During this session
Williams for the first time was advised of his right to remain silent, but not his
right to assistance of counsel. Williams, 323 F.2d at 67. Afterwards, Williams
was taken to the Graff home for purposes of recreating the murder for detectives.
Williams, 211 F. Supp. at 361; see also Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note
34, at 18-19. At the residence, Graffs mother accused Williams of killing her
little girl. 8 Receive Reward in Solving Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1947, at
28; see also Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 34, at 20. Graff s mother was
physically restrained by law enforcement from assaulting Williams. 8 Receive
Reward in Solving Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1947, at 28. As approximately
twenty Brooklyn police officers escorted Williams from the premises, a mob,
which had assembled on the street, began calling Williams a murderer and poking
at Williams with sticks. Id.
40
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court.4 4 After the booking, Williams was taken to Donald's school
so that a positive identification could be made, which Donald was
unable to do.4 5 Up to this point, Williams had not been provided
with the assistance of counsel.4 6
Despite his confession, Williams pled not guilty to Graffs
murder and his trial began in January of 1948.47 Donald, the only
witness to the crime, testified during cross-examination that his
sister's killer was a white man who had red skin and stood five feet
five inches tall. 48 Williams height was recorded at six feet. 49 That
evening, Donald spoke with detectives and the District Attorney.50
The next day, Donald recanted his description of the killer, claiming
he was "all mixed up." 51 After Donald's recantation, the prosecution
informed the court that its case-in-chief did not rely on Donald's

44 8 Receive Reward in Solving Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1947, at 28;
see also Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 34, at 21. Those rewarded for

solving Graff s murder included three detectives, two patrolmen, and three other
high-ranking police officers. 8 Receive Reward in Solving Murder, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 1947, at 28.
45 Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 34, at 21.
46 See Williams, 323 F.2d at 67. Williams was not represented by counsel at
his first arraignment. See Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 34, app. at 5a.
Williams was visited by private counsel before his second arraignment on
September 11th or 12th, but it is unclear whether counsel was present at the
second arraignment. Compare id. app. at 16a, with id. at 22.
47 Williams, 323 F.2d at 67; Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 34, at
21-22.
48 Williams, 323 F.2d at 67; Witness Helps Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
1948, at 20; Slayer Gets Stay FromHigh Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1949, at 17;
see also Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 34, at 22-23.
'9 Williams, 323 F.2d at 67; Witness Helps Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
1948, at 20; Slayer Gets Stay From High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1949, at 17;
see also Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 34, at 22-23.
"o Williams, 323 F.2d at 67; see also Youth Found Guilty ofMurderingGirl,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1948, at 46.
si Youth Found Guilty ofMurdering Girl, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1948, at 46.
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testimony. 52 This left the confessions, which Williams argued were
the result of coercion, as the only evidence of guilt."
The jury found Williams guilty of murder in the first degree and
recommended a life sentence, 5 4 but the sentencing judge rejected
that recommendation5 5 based on evidence presented at trial and
additional un-cross-examined sources pursuant to the New York
Criminal Code. 56 According to the sentencing judge, this evidence
52 Williams, 323 F.2d at 67; see also Youth Found Guilty ofMurdering Girl,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1948, at 46.; Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 34, at
23.
23 Williams, 323 F.2d at 67. Williams testified at trial that law enforcement's

brutal torture coerced him to give a false confession. Id. Williams testified that
detectives beat him with "a blackjack, a rubber hose, and a club" for
approximately eleven hours. Youth Lays Confession to 3D Degree, BROOKLYN
EAGLE, Jan. 16, 1948, at 1. Williams also testified that detectives kicked him and
punched his left eye. Id. See also Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 34, at
9-11 (summarizing testimony of police brutality that included handcuffing
Williams to a hot radiator, squeezing Williams's testicles until he fell
unconsciousness, threatening to throw Williams out a window, and threats to
shoot Williams). Defense counsel introduced a series of photographs taken of
Williams on September 20, 1947. United States ex rel. Williams v. Fay, 211 F.
Supp. 359, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The testimony of detectives and the district
attorney denied any coercion. Id. The jail clerk testified that Williams only
complained of swollen legs caused by rheumatic fever. Id. The jail physician
testified that while Williams did appear to suffer injury, those injuries were
inconsequential compared to Williams's testimony. Id.
5 Williams, 323 F.2d at 65-67; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1045-a. See
generally Youth Sentenced to Die in the Chair, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1948, at 48.
" Williams, 323 F.2d at 65; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 1045, 1045-a
(McKinney 1949) (providing that murder in the first degree is punishable by death
unless the jury recommends life imprisonment, but also granting the presiding
judge discretion to impose a life imprisonment or death regardless of the jury's
recommendation).
56

Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 242-43 (1949). At the time New

York law provided that:
Before rendering judgment or pronouncing sentence the court shall
cause the defendant's previous criminal record to be submitted to it,
including any reports that may have been made as a result of a mental,
phychiatric [sic] or physical examination of such person, and may seek
any information that will aid the court in determining the proper
treatment of such defendant.

N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 482 (McKinney 1949).
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proved by a preponderance that (1) Williams committed the
burglaries for which he had originally been arrested but never
charged;5 7 (2) Williams was a "menace to society";5 8 and (3)
Williams "possessed a morbid sexuality" and was a "psychopathic
liar whose personality [was] permeated with psychosexual habits of
thought and conduct."5 9 Convinced that the jury's recommendation

5 Williams, 337 U.S. at 244.
After considering approximately thirty
uncharged burglaries to which Williams had allegedly confessed or had allegedly
been identified as a participant, the sentencing judge described Williams as a
"well-schooled" veteran of burglaries. Id. See also Brief for AppellantDefendant at 6, Williams, 337 U.S. 241 (No. 671), 1949 WL 50658 at *6.
* Williams, 337 U.S. at 244. The sentencing judge found:

[Williams] perfected what he thought was a foolproof method of
earning a living in an easy way. Like others of this kind, however, he
finally found himself in a situation, not to his liking, and decided to
destroy whatever was in his way to a continued success in the criminal
career chosen by him. It is unfortunate that his path was blocked by
this young girl who showed such bravery, in the protection of her life.
Brief for Appellant-Defendant, supra note 57, at 9. According to the Court,
Williams did not challenge the accuracy of the report, did not ask the judge to
disregard it, and did not request an opportunity to refute any portion through
cross-examination or any other means. Williams, 337 U.S. at 244.
59 Youth Sentenced to Die in the Chair, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1948, at 48. The
sentencing judge considered information from a detective that Williams was seen
taking photographs of young children at public schools. Brief for AppellantDefendant, supra note 57, at 8. The sentencing judge also relied on the following
as evidence of Williams's morbid sexuality:
We also have the situation involving the Goldiner family who resided
in the ground-floor apartment at 145 Legion Street, about two weeks
before [Williams's] arrest at about two a.m. At that time, their sevenyear-old daughter was asleep alone in a rear room, the parents being in
another room. The child says that she was awakened when she felt
someone twisting her feet. She says that the lower part of her pajamas
had been taken off and the defendant placed himself on top of her and
placed his penis between her legs. He had one of his hands over her
mouth to prevent her from making any outcry. He then arose, and as
he was buttoning his pants, she made an outcry which frightened the
defendant, who ran out of the apartment. The mother of the child says
that she found evidence of discharge on the bed of the child. The child
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of life imprisonment would have been different if all "facts" had
been presented,6 0 the sentencing judge ordered death by
electrocution and reasoned that "it would stultify [his] conscience"
to accept the jury's sentence. 6 1 A unanimous New York Court of
Appeals affirmed both the conviction and death sentence. 62
Williams's appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States
focused on the narrow question of whether due process required an
opportunity to cross-examine or rebut information considered for
the first time at sentencing. 6 3 The Court evaluated the denial of
confrontation as a felony sentencing right under the due process
standard. The Court held that due process was not "a device for
freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold of trial
procedure"; to so hold would "hinder if not preclude all courtsstate and federal-from making progressive efforts to improve the
administration of criminal justice." 64 Nor could due process render
a sentence void simply because a judge obtained out-of-court
information to assist in fixing punishment.65

also positively identified the defendant as the one who perpetrated this
act.
Id. at 8-9. None of the above referenced "evidence" was admitted at trial. Id. at
10.
60 Youth Sentenced to Die in the Chair, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1948, at 48.
61 Id.
62 People v. Williams, 83 N.E.2d 698, 698 (N.Y. 1949), amended by 84
N.E.2d 446 (N.Y. 1949) (affirming Williams's conviction and declining to answer
whether a Fourteenth Amendment violation occurred because Williams's
"sentence of death [was] based upon information supplied by persons with whom
the accused had not been confronted and as to whom he had no opportunity for
cross-examination or rebuttal.").
61 Williams, 337 U.S. at 243. The Williams's Court also framed the issue of
confrontation as a felony sentencing right as follows: "The question relates to the
rules of evidence applicable to the manner in which a judge may obtain
information to guide him in the imposition of sentence upon an already convicted
defendant." Id. at 244.
64 Id. at 251.
65 Id. at 252. According to the Williams Court, "[m]odern changes in the
treatment of offenders make it more necessary now than a century ago for
observance of the distinctions in the evidential procedure in the trial and
sentencing processes.... Under the practice of individualizing punishments,
investigation techniques have been given an important role." Id. at 248-49.
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Williams described New York's sentencing statute as one that
emphasized the "prevalent modem philosophy of penology that
punishment should fit the offender, and not merely the crime." 66
The Williams Court rejected confrontation as a felony
sentencing right, reasoning that consideration of uncrossed
information for purposes of sentencing was a discretionary power 67
that dated to pre-founding times. 68 The Court explained:
[B]oth before and since the American colonies became a
nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a
policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a
wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used
to assist him in determining the kind and extent of
punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law. 69
Williams assumes a level ofjudicial discretion that did not exist
in the era of determinate sentencing, which was the dominant
sentencing model at the time of the founding. In fact, the sentencing
court's discretionary authority described in Williams 70 was actually
a cornerstone of the indeterminate sentencing model that emerged
after the founding and that was at its height at the time Williams was
decided. Because of Williams, sentencing procedures have been
allowed to "take whatever shape the states might think appropriate
to serve the goals of indeterminate sentencing." 7 Due process did
66

Id. at 247-48 (noting that indeterminate sentencing replaced rigidly fixed
punishments of the determinate era). This ideal is directly reflective of the
indeterminate sentencing model, which declared reformation and rehabilitation
more important than retribution. Id. The Court provided no guidance of how
Williams's death sentence met the goals of rehabilitation or reformation.
67 Id. at 249 (noting the increased involvement of non-judicial agencies,
particularly probation and other investigatory agencies).
68 Id. at 246.
69

1d.

'o Williams, 337 U.S. at 247-51 ("The considerations we have set out
admonish us against treating the due-process clause as a uniform command that
courts throughout the Nation abandon their age-old practice of seeking
information from out-of-court sources to guide their judgment toward a more
enlightened and just sentence.").
1 Susan N. Herman, The Tail that Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated FactFinding Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines and the Limits ofDue Process,
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not require confrontation at felony sentencing, and a broad range of
unchallenged evidence could be used to support a higher sentence. 72
Circuit courts that have ruled that confrontation rights do not
apply at felony sentencing 73 not only commonly cite Williams, but
also Barber v. Page74 and Mancusi v. Stubbs. 75 Barber succinctly
states: "[t]he right to confrontation is basically a trial right." 76
Barber was not a felony sentencing case.7 7 Neither was Mancusi,
although the Court's holding was quite material to punishment. The
defendant in Mancusi was convicted and sentenced under New
York's second-offender law based in part on a Tennessee murder
conviction that had been overturned due to the denial of effective
counsel.7 8 The New York court admitted witness statements from
the overturned Tennessee trial over the defendant's objection. 79 The

66 S. CAL. L. REv. 289, 318-19 (1992) (discussing federalism as a theme in
Williams).
72 Williams, 337 U.S. at 252.

Justice Murphy dissented and argued that
"[d]ue process of law includes . .. the idea that a person accused of crime shall be
accorded a fair hearing through all stages of the proceedings against him." Id. at
253 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (also urging sentencing judges to hesitate when
Justice
increasing punishment beyond that which the jury recommended).
Murphy maintained:
The record . . . indicates that the judge exercised his discretion to
deprive a man of his life, in reliance on material made available to him
in a probation report, consisting almost entirely of evidence that would
have been inadmissible at the trial. Some, such as allegations of prior
crimes, was irrelevant. Much was incompetent as hearsay. All was
damaging, and none was subject to scrutiny by the defendant.
Id.
7 See generally Sara Sun Beale, ProceduralIssues Raised by Guidelines
Sentencing: The ConstitutionalSignificance of the 'Elements of the Sentence,' 35
WM. & MARY L. REv. 147 n.2 (1993).
74

390 U.S. at 719 (1968).
U.S. at 204 (1972).
Barber, 390 U.S. at 720-21.

5 408
76

" Barber objected at trial to the admission of un-cross-examined preliminary
hearing testimony. Id. at 720-21. The Court granted habeas relief on the ground
that state authorities failed to make good faith efforts to obtain the witness. Id. at

724-26.
71

Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 207-10.

7

Id.
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Mancusi Court found there was sufficient evidence that the
testimony of the unavailable Tennessee witness was reliable. 8 0
Thus, the overturned Tennessee murder conviction was counted as
the predicate offense under New York's second-offender law.
Barber and Mancusi rely heavily on the assumption that
confrontation has always enjoyed a peaceful coexistence with
hearsay rules.81 Barber and Mancusi were also decided at a time
when literal application of the Confrontation Clause was rejected for
fear of abrogating most of the hearsay exceptions. 82 Both cases turn
on the prosecution's good faith showing of unavailability and the
defendant's prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 83
Barber and Mancusi upheld the erroneous principle that because
confrontation and hearsay were rooted in due process, 84 reliability
was a sufficient surrogate85 for cross-examination at trial. 86 Ohio v.
Roberts best articulates that principle:
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for crossexamination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally
requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his
statement is admissible only if it bears adequate "indicia of
reliability." Reliability can be inferred without more in a
case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be

80

Id. at 209.
" Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-67; but see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
155-56 (1970) (warning against the assumption that the overlap between hearsay
rules and confrontation is complete and that confrontation guarantees a right
beyond
what is provided by hearsay rules).
82
Id. at 63.
83
Id. at 65-77.
84
Id. at 66.
8 Chhablani, supra note 15, at 514 (quoting John G. Douglass, Beyond
Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination, and the Right to
Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WAS. L. REV. 191, 206 (1999)).
86 United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707, 712 (2d Cir. 1978) (citations
omitted).
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excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.87
Like Barber and Mancusi, Roberts presumed that the
Confrontation Clause reflected only a "preference for face-to-face
confrontation at trial." 8 8 Roberts was arrested and charged with
forgery and possession of stolen credit cards that belonged to his
girlfriend's parents. 89 At trial, Roberts testified that his girlfriend
provided the allegedly stolen items with the understanding that he
was allowed to use them. 90 In response to the prosecution's
questioning at the preliminary hearing, Roberts's girlfriend admitted
that she knew Roberts and that she permitted Roberts to stay at her
apartment for several days while she was away. 91 She also testified
that she neither gave Roberts her parents' checks and credit cards
nor granted to Roberts permission to use them. 92 Roberts's girlfriend
did not appear at trial 93 and the prosecution was allowed to admit
her preliminary hearing transcript to rebut Roberts's testimony. 94
87 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.

Id. at 630-64 (emphasis added); see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,
846 (1990) (reasoning that face-to-face confrontation was only a preference
because the primary purpose of confrontation was to ensure reliability).
89 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58. The checks were in the name of Barnard Isaacs
and the stolen credit cards belong to both Barnard and Amy Issacs. Id.
90

Id. at 59.

91 Id.
92

1Id. According to the Roberts Court, defense counsel neither requested that
Roberts's girlfriend be declared a hostile witness nor that she be subjected to crossexamination. Id.
93 Id. at 59-60. The prosecution sent five subpoenas for four different trial
dates to Roberts's girlfriend at her parents' Ohio residence. Id. at 59. Roberts's
girlfriend was not present upon execution, nor did she contact the court. Id.
Before admission of the preliminary hearing transcript of Roberts's girlfriend, the
trial judge conducted a voir dire of Amy Isaacs who testified she infrequently
received telephone calls from and knew of no emergency contact information for
her daughter. Id. at 59-60.
94 The Ohio Court of Appeals found that the prosecution failed to make a
good faith showing of unavailability because the prosecution failed to seek the
whereabouts of Roberts's girlfriend for purposes of trial. Id. at 60. The Ohio
Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's finding of availability, but held that there
was no constitutionally sufficient opportunity to cross-examine Roberts's
girlfriend at the preliminary hearing. Id. at 60-61. While increased due diligence
would not have procured the attendance of Roberts's girlfriend at trial because her
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Roberts made clear that the Confrontation Clause did not
require actual confrontation. 9 5 Instead, where a witness was
unavailable, the confrontation requirement was satisfied by hearsay
that was reliable and trustworthy. 96 The Court found that the
prosecution made a good faith showing of unavailability and that
Roberts had an adequate opportunity for cross-examination during
the preliminary hearing. 97 Additionally, Roberts postulated that
hearsay rules stemmed from the same historical origins as the
Confrontation Clause. 98 In such cases, due process only required
cross-examination when an actual hearsay violation occurred. 99
Roberts is an incompatible outlier from the Court's more recent
interpretations of the Confrontation Clause. For example, Crawford
v. Washington 00 involved the admission of pre-recorded testimonial
statements by a wife against her husband, who was the defendant
and against whom she could not testify based on spousal
privilege. ot The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed admission
of Mrs. Crawford's recorded statements, satisfied that they were
both reliable and trustworthy.1 02 The Court reversed.1 03
The Crawford Court ruled that the due process standard relied
upon in Roberts was unpredictable and that the confrontation
standard could not tolerate such unpredictability.' 04 Crawford reexamined the historical origins and text of the Confrontation Clause
and recognized two historical suggestions about the Founders'
whereabouts were entirely unknown, defense counsel's questioning at the
preliminary hearing did not amount to a cross examination. Id.
9

96
17

Id. at 63-64.
Id. at 65-67.
Id. at 65-77.

98

Id. at 66.
99 See Fatico, 579 F.2d at 712-13 (" Williams does not hold that all hearsay
information must be considered.").
100 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
' Id. at 38-40.
102 Id. at 41. The Washington Court of Appeals found that some of Mrs.

Crawford's responses contradicted previous answers to specific questions. In fact,
at one point Mrs. Crawford admitted she closed her eyes during the incident for
which her husband was on trial. Id.
'03 Id. at 42.
10 4 Id. at 60-67 (examining and discussing inconsistencies in the application
of hearsay rules in post-Roberts confrontation cases).
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understanding of the confrontation right.'os First, the Confrontation
Clause was intended to prohibit ex-parte examinations as evidence
Second, pre-ratification testimonial
against the accused. 106
statements of absent witnesses would not have been allowed without
a showing of unavailability and a prior opportunity for crossexamination. 0 7 The Court held that "[w]here testimonial statements
are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy
constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually
prescribes: confrontation." 0 8 The Court ultimately found Mrs.
Crawford's statements were of the type the Framers intended the
Confrontation Clause to prohibit.' 09
Noting that "testimonial statements" can be used for purposes
other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted,1 0 Crawford
explicitly limited the requirement of confrontation to "witnesses
against the accused" who "bear testimony."'" Thus, Crawford's
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause applied only to
testimonial statements.11 2 Davis v. Washington clarified the
distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial statements.11 3
Davis involved the admissibility of statements of unavailable
witnesses in unrelated criminal trials in Indiana" 4 and Washington

'os

Id. at 43-50.

o6 Id. at 50.
107 Id. at 53-54.
108 Id. at 61, 68-69
(holding that the due process standard was
the right of confrontation," which reflected "a
with
odds
at
"fundamentally
judgment . .. about how reliability can be best determined.").
10 Id. at 52-53 (holding that statements taken by police officers in the course
of an interrogation bear a striking resemblance to examinations by justices of the
peace in England); see also Fisher, supra note 6, at 59 (describing Crawford as a
"thoroughgoing originalist opinion").
1o Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9 (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409,
414 (1985)).
1 Id. at 51-52.
1 Id. at 68.
113 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
114 Id. at 819-21. The victim was found alone on her front porch when
officers arrived and she granted permission for the officers to enter her home. Id.
at 819. The defendant, the victim's husband, was waiting in the kitchen. Id. The
victim was questioned in her living room and afterwards was provided with and
signed an affidavit. Id. at 819-20. The defendant attempted to participate in the
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State." 5 Davis defined testimonialstatements as those that are made
when the circumstances objectively indicated that no ongoing
emergency existed and that the primary purpose of the interrogation
(or questioning) was to establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to a criminal prosecution. 116 Nontestimonial statements are
those that are made when given in the course of an interrogation (or
questioning) and where circumstances objectively indicate that the
primary purpose of the interrogation was to assist police during an
ongoing emergency." 7
The Davis Court recognized
the fluidity of the
18
testimonial/nontestimonial distinction'
and instructed that for
confrontation purposes statements might begin as nontestimoniali.e., responsive to an interrogation to determine the need for
emergency assistance-but later evolve into testimonial statements
once that purpose has been achieved.11 9 Relying on this reasoning,
the Court ruled that the recorded 911 statements in Washington state
were nontestimonial, and properly admitted, because (1) the victim
was speaking about events as they were actually happening rather
than describing past events, (2) the victim's call for help was against
a bona fide physical threat, and (3) elicitation of the victim's

conversation, but was retrained by an officer who also remained in the kitchen.
Id. 1 5
' Id. at 818-19. The defendant's ex-girlfriend provided a 911 operator with
defendant's name and accused him of assault. Id. at 817-18. The defendant was
present during this portion of the call. Id. The victim described the context of the
assault and provided other identifying information about the defendant to the
operator after the defendant left the scene. Id. at 818.
116 Davis, 547 U.S. at 819-20.
117
Id. at 822.
" See id The Davis Court reasoned that "Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence was carefully applied only in the testimonial context" well into the
20th century. Id. at 824-25. Testimonial statements were separated from other
hearsay that was subject to traditional limitations barring admission, but not under
the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 821. Statements taken by police officers in the
course of interrogations were characterized as a core class of testimonial
statements. Id. at 822.
19
l Id. at 828. For purposes of the Confrontation Clause, the Davis Court was
confident that trial courts could recognize the point at which statements became
testimonial. Id. at 829.
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statements was necessary to the resolution of an emergency.120 On
the other hand, the statements contained in the victim affidavit in
Indiana were testimonial, and therefore improperly admitted,
because (1) there was no emergency in progress, (2) the testifying
officer admitted that the interrogation was part of an investigation
into possible past criminal conduct, and (3) there was a lapse of time
between executing the affidavit and the events described therein.'21
Later, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Court held that
testimonial statements also included sworn certificates by analysts
at state crime laboratories.' 2 2 Yet in Michigan v. Bryant, the Court
held that a dying murder victim's statements were not testimonial
even though they were given in response to questions by law
enforcement officers responding at the scene before the victim's
death.1 23

Crawford makes clear that actual confrontation and crossexamination are the best methods to test the veracity of testimonial
statements and Davis demonstrates the testimonial/nontestimonial
distinction.124 Despite the fact that the rules of confrontation easily
could be applied at felony sentencing, many sentencing guidelines
place few limits on the use of un-cross-examined information
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a convicted
defendant. 125 Professor Eang Ngov has described how sentencing
courts can reach far back in time to determine what conduct relates

120

Id. at 826-29. Davis reasoned that the statements at issue in Washington
involved a victim who as unprotected by the police while in apparent immediate
danger from the defendant. Id. at 831. These statements were not a story about
the past, but were an attempt to seek aid in the present. Id.
121 Id. at 829-32. The Court described the affidavit at issue in Indiana as a
narrative of past events that was delivered after the danger ceased. Id. at 832.
According to the testifying officer, the purpose of the affidavit was to establish
events that previously occurred. Id.
122 557 U.S. 305, 310-11, 329 (2009) ("This case involves little more than
the application of our holding in Crawford.").
123 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1166-67 (2011).
124 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (noting that while in Crawford a core class of
testimonial statements were set forth, it was unnecessary to "endorse any of them
because 'some statements qualify under any definition').
125 Ngov, supra note 9, at 267 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006)); Becker,
supra note 12, at 154.
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to the defendant's convicted offense.1 2 6 This evidence may include
statements recorded during telephone interviews or signed witness
statements gathered by law enforcement or prosecutors.1 2 7 The
Honorable Edward Becker has described such reports and
statements as likely to include hearsay, double hearsay, and triple
hearsay. 128 Moreover, during the plea negotiations, defense counsel
may be unaware which testimonial statements, if any, will be
presented at sentencing. 129 There is usually little opportunity to
investigate the statement's truth or veracity once its materiality
becomes apparent. Despite these serious implications, reliability is
the current standard to test information presented at felony
sentencing hearings.130
Ngov, supra note 9, at 237-38.
United States v. O'Meara, 895 F.2d 1216, 1223 (8th Cir. 1990) (Bright,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that in federal sentencing,
probation officers replaced the court in the exercise of crucial judgment calls); see
also John S. Diera, Guidelines Sentencing: ProbationOfficer Responsibilitiesand
InteragencyIssues, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1989, at 3. According to Diera, in the
federal regime probation officers have become an "independent" investigator. Id.
For example, probation officers prepare the presentence report provided to the
judge, which includes a tentative advisory guideline range based on the
information gathered during the sentencing investigation. Id; see also Jack B.
Weinstein, A Trial Judge's Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 66 S. CA. L. REV. 357, 364 (1992); Becker, supra note 12, at 161.
126
127

128 Becker, supra note 12, at 161.

i2 See generally, Shaakirrah R. Sanders, Making the Right Call for
Confrontationat Felony Sentencing, 65 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791 (2014).
130
Ngov, supranote 9, at 258. Ngov argues that use of acquitted conduct as
a category of "relevant conduct" essentially second-guesses a prior jury's
determination of the truth and veracity of testimonial statements. Id. Sentencing
courts are permitted to use acquitted conduct to increase punishment despite the
jury's declaration of "legal innocence." Id. at 258-60 nn.142-50, 284, 287
(discussing the impact of acquitted conduct on subsequent proceedings, including
probation and parole revocation hearings). Thus, in some cases, "a defendant can
be sentenced to the same length of imprisonment that would have been imposed
had he actually been convicted of the offense." Ngov, supra note 9, at 242
(footnote omitted). But see 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES at *36162 ("If the jury therefore find the prisoner not guilty, he is then forever [sic] quit
and discharged of the accusation . . . .") (footnote omitted). Ngov argues that this

gives the prosecution a "second bite at the apple" to prove conduct already
rejected as punishable, which impermissibly allows the sentencing judge to ignore
the jury's previous findings. Ngov, supra note 9, at 261, 267, 288, 291.
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Crawfordis premised on the rationale that the Court had strayed
too far from confrontation's "original meaning." 3 ' in many
respects, the procedures for fixing punishment have also strayed far
from those that would be recognized by the Framers. In the modem
U.S. criminal justice system, testimonial statements are integral to
the process of establishing guilt and fixing punishment.
Jurisprudence on the question of confrontation as a felony
sentencing right post-dates the founding. As demonstrated in
Williams, that jurisprudence is based on the reasoning that
consideration of uncrossed information for purposes of sentencing
was a discretionary power 32 that dated to pre-founding times.' 33 As
a result, a broad range of unchallenged evidence continues to be
used to support higher criminal sentences.' 34
Without a doubt, the Framers of the United States Constitution
and its Bill of Rights would not recognize the modem U.S. criminal
justice system.1 35 As Justice Kennedy recently acknowledged in
Missouri v. Frye, plea bargaining has "become so central to the
administration of.

.

. criminal justice . . . that. . . '[i]t is not some

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004). But see Thomas Y.
Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It? Fictional
Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 105, 120-89, 196206 (2005) (questioning Crawfords historical accuracy on the issue of crossexamination and unavailability at the time of the founding, as well as the use of
nontestimonial statements). Davies argues that Crawfordglosses over important
distinctions between felony and misdemeanor procedure. Id. Davies also argues
that at the time of the founding, jurisprudence on hearsay or its exceptions had yet
to be fully developed. Id.
132 Williams, 337 U.S. at 249 (noting the increased involvement of nonjudicial agencies, particularly probation and other investigatory agencies).
.Id. at 246.
134
Id. at 252. But see id. at 253 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (urging sentencing
judges to hesitate when increasing punishment beyond that which the jury
recommended).
"3 See John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at
CapitalSentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1967, 2015 (2005). Douglass noted that
criminal procedure in the framer's world encompassed "a single, unified trial with
no separate sentencing." Id. In contrast, modem practice "spans two worlds: first
a trial, then a sentencing," which are treated as "separate universes, governed by
very different rules." Id. at 1967-68.
131
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adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the . . . system."" 3 6
Perhaps plea bargaining occurred at the time of the founding.
According to Professor George Fisher, an eminent scholar on plea
bargaining, the earliest record of plea bargaining does not appear
until 1809.137 Nevertheless, at the time of the founding the purpose
of trial was to establish the specific offense conduct that merited
punishment. 13 8 The purpose of sentencing was to announce the
punishment.1 39 Evidence suggests that little judicial discretion
existed pre-founding to influence felony sentencing. 14 0
Unlike in the time of the founding, fact-finding is no longer
limited to the trial and also occurs at the sentencing hearing.' 4 1 Due
to the prevalence of plea bargaining in the current U.S. system, the
vast majority of cases do not result in a trial. As a result, the
resolution of the material facts that constitute the offense occurs
after the plea and usually requires the use of evidence at sentencing
that has never been confronted during a trial or any other
proceeding.1 42 In this manner, the modern sentencing hearing has
become quite similar to a trial. 43 However, counsel is unable to

136 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargainingas Contract, 101 YALE. L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
1'

See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINiNG'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA

BARGAINING IN AMERICA 22 (2003). As does Fisher, this Article distinguishes
between the expression "clear plea bargaining" and "guilty plea." Id. Fisher uses
the term "clear plea bargaining" to refer to cases "in which the clerk's account
discloses a concession made in exchange for the defendant's plea." Id. Fisher
uses the term guilty plea "to refer to cases in which the defendant pled guilty but
the record reveals no compensating concession." Id. This Article uses the simple
term "plea bargaining" to refer to what Fisher termed "clear plea bargaining."
" Penny J. White, "HeSaid," "She Said," and Issues ofLife and Death: The
Right to Confrontationat CapitalSentencing Proceedings, 19 REGENT U. L. REV.

387, 397 (2007).
'" Id; see also Becker, supra note 12, at 158.
140 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 130, at *378.
141 Benjamin C. McMurray, Challenging Untested Facts at Sentencing: The
Applicability of Crawford at Sentencing After Booker, 37 McGEORGE L. REV.
589, 592 (2006); Douglass, supra note 135, at 1972; Becker, supra note 12, at 158
(describing guidelines sentencing as thoroughly fact driven).
14 2 JAMES E. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS 156-57 (1st ed.

1975) (observing that sentencing judges rarely make detailed inquiries regarding
the factual basis for the plea before accepting it).
143 Becker, supra note 12, at 159-60; 166-67.
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cross-examine testimonial statements that are material to
punishment, which ties defense counsel's hands and leaves the
defendant with no meaningful opportunity to test the evidence that
is material to punishment.1 44 Counsel's ability to marshal and prove
the facts, introduce evidence, and generally aid and assist the
defendant is significantly hindered at sentencing.1 4 5 The inability to
cross-examine evidence that is material to punishment also increases
the risk that a defendant will be punished based on unreliable
evidence. 146
Many federal courts are disinclined to reexamine whether and
to what extent sentencing discretion was limited by application of
the Confrontation Clause.147 These courts reasoned that for
confrontation purposes, the "criminal prosecution" did not extend
beyond the trial.1 48 These courts have described cross-examination
during criminal punishment as impractical and have predicted crossexamination would cause endless delay.1 4 9 Most jurisprudence
denying the value of confrontation as a felony sentencing right
precedes that which incorporated the Sixth Amendment to criminal
defendants in state courts.' 5 0 Moreover, the denial of confrontation
rights at felony sentencing is an anomaly among other Sixth
Amendment rights that apply at sentencing. As next discussed, this
anomaly denies an important parallelism among the Sixth

144 Id. at 164-65.

Id. at 160-62.
Id. at 168 (describing the Confrontation Clause as the obvious candidate
to ensure basic fairness at sentencing proceedings).
147 McMurray, supra note 141, at 605-07 (discussing lower court rulings
that confrontation did not apply at felony sentencing as a failure to "seriously
engage the text of the Sixth Amendment"). For an example of such a lower court
ruling, see United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707, 713 (2d Cir. 1978).
14 8 See Sunrhodes, 831 F.2d at 1543 (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204,
211 (1972)). Mancusi involved a New York felony defendant sentenced as a
second offender based, in part, on a prior murder conviction in Tennessee.
Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 205. Stubbs challenged the sentence, arguing violations of
substantive and procedural due process. Id. at 209. The Mancusi Court held that
confrontation was "basically a trial right" that included "both the opportunity to
cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the
witness." Id. at 211; see also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
149 Fatico, 579 F.2d at 711-12.
145

14 6

150 Berman, supra note 14, at 391.
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Amendment's interrelated rights of counsel, jury trial, and
confrontation.
II.

EMERGENCE OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT'S

Counsel and Jury

Trial CLAUSES As FELONY SENTENCING RIGHTS
The current approach to the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause recognizes the right at trial, but not at sentencing. This
approach to the Sixth Amendment is not unique to confrontation.
But the trial-right-only rule has endured longer in confrontation
jurisprudence than other Sixth Amendment guarantees. 151
The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.1 52
The Amendment enshrines seven distinct rights that apply
during a "criminal prosecution." l3 For purposes of this Article, the
most important rights include the right to confront adversarial
witnesses, the right to counsel, and the right to trial by jury.1 5 4
The rule that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause does
not apply at felony sentencing rests on the assumption that
proceedings related to punishment are not part of the "criminal
prosecution." Francis Heller, a mid-twentieth century Sixth
Amendment historian, describes the term "criminal prosecution" in

151 See generally, Shaakirrah R. Sanders, UnbrandingConfrontationas Only
a Trial Right, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1257 (2014).
152 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI (emphasis added).

15 See also Chhablani, supra note 15, at 492-507 (outlining the seven
procedural protections provided under the Sixth Amendment).
154

McMurray, supra note 141, at 615.
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the Framer's era as beginning with an arraignment and ending with
either a verdict that pronounces the defendant's innocence or a
sentence that pronounces the defendant's punishment. 155 But
founding era documents regarding the Amendment offer little
guidance on the question of what proceedings constituted the
''criminal prosecution." Nor do founding era documents define the
meaning or scope of the term. 156 Nevertheless, an early nineteenth
century dictionary defines a "prosecution" as the "institution or
commencement and continuance of a criminal suit; the process of
exhibiting formal charges against an offender before a legal tribunal,
and pursuing them to final judgment."1 57
Eminent founding era scholar William Blackstone described
felony prosecutions in the framer's era' 58 as involving twelve stages
"I FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 54 (1951).
See also White, supra note 138, at 395-397. White explains that "Sixth
Amendment rights do not begin and end with the in-court proceeding commonly
known as a trial." Id. According to White, during the time of the founding the
verdict and sentence were accomplished in one proceeding. Id. That unified
procedure is what the framers described as the "criminal prosecution" when
drafting the Sixth Amendment. Id.; see also McMurray, supra note 141, at 616
(arguing that "the entire process of securing the criminal judgment [is] the
prosecution"). McMurray argues that "where a defendant pleads guilty to one
count in exchange for the government's promise to dismiss other counts, the
government will typically not dismiss the other counts until after the defendant
has been sentenced." McMurray, supranote 141, at 616. This confirmed that the
prosecution was complete when the defendant had been sentenced. Id.
156 See id. at 616 & n.191; Stephanos Bibas, Two Cheers, Not Three, for
Sixth Amendment Originalism, 34 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 45, 46 (2011).
157 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1828); see also RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1552
(Stuart B. Flexner & Leonore C. Hauck eds., 2d ed. 1993) (defining a prosecution
as "the institution and carrying on of legal proceedings against a person"). For an
example of the Supreme Court turning to the 1828 version of Webster's dictionary
in order to interpret the Confrontation Clause, see Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36,51 (2004).
15 See Douglass, supra note 135, at 2008.
Douglass argues that if "the
textual question is simply whether a sentencing is part of a 'criminal prosecution,'
the answer would seem self-evident. After all, why bother with the process of
criminal prosecution if not for the sentence?" Id.; see also White, supra note 138,
at 393 (arguing that a simple reading of the relevant constitutional text supports
the right to confront evidence -presented at capital sentencing hearings). The
Honorable Ronald Arnold, the late Chief Judge of the United States Court of
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ranging from the arrest to execution. 159 Blackstone did not
specifically list or separately label sentencing hearings. 1 60 But
Professor Benjamin McMurray argues that Blackstone's stage nine,
which is labeled "judgment and its consequences," corresponds to
our modem understanding of criminal sentencing.161 McMurray
suggests that proceedings related to punishment were part of
founding era "criminal prosecutions"l 6 2 because "Blackstone's
description of what happens at 'judgment' is precisely what modem
courts do at sentencing." 1 63
The Sixth Amendment's failure to offer guidance on whether
criminal sentencing constitutes part of the "criminal prosecution" is
not a failure that can be attributed to the Framers. Professors Carissa
and F. Andrew Hessick have theorized that the text and structure of
the Amendment reflect the founding-era model of determinate
sentencing.1 64 Professors Nancy King and Susan Klein have argued

Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, appeared to agree with Douglass and White. See

United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 407 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Arnold, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Surely no one would contend that
sentencing is not a part, and a vital one, of a 'criminal prosecution."').
159 The twelve stages of prosecution include arrest, commitment and bail,
prosecution, process upon indictment, arraignment and its incidents, plea and
issue, trial and conviction, benefit of clergy, judgment and its consequences,
reversal of judgment, reprieve and pardon, and execution. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 130, at *286; see also McMurray, supra note 141, at 617. As theorized by
McMurray, the term "prosecution" as listed in Blackstone's stage three refers only
to the charging stage. See McMurray, supra note 141, at 617.
..
oSee id. at 617-18.
161 See id. at 618 (hypothesizing that stage nine "falls chronologically right
where sentencing falls under modem criminal procedure: between trial and
appeal").
162 The standard way of determining original objective meaning of the words
and phrases of the Constitution is to examine founding period writings. See
Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Records of the State Ratifying
Conventions as a Source of the OriginalMeaning of the U.S. Constitution, 2009
U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 462 (2009). According to McMurray, "William Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland.. . was widely read and relied on by the
founders." See, e.g., McMurray, supra note 141, at 616-18 & nn.191-99.
16

Id.; see also 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 130, at *368-82.

Carissa B. Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional
Rights at Sentencing, 99 CAL. L. REV. 47, 51 (2011) (postulating that determinate
164
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that at the time of the founding, there were relatively few felony
offenses. 16 5 According to Professor Penny White, a pre-determined
sentence resulted if a defendant was found guilty.1 66 The most
common punishment for felony convictions was death.1 67 Hessick
and Hessick hypothesize that the founding-era practice of unitary
trials and sentencing left little or no role for the trial judge regarding
a felony defendant's sentence. 168 Thus, argue Hessick and Hessick,
the drafters of the Sixth Amendment had little reason to consider
trial authority separate from sentencing authority.1 69

sentencing schemes "presented no occasion to consider the extent to which
constitutional protections should be treated differently at sentencing than at trial").
65 Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV.
1467, 1507-08 (2001). King and Klein found that the First Congress had enacted
only twenty-two crimes by 1790. Id.
166 White, supra note 138, at 396-97. White describes modem day trials as
involving a bifurcated process by which there is a finding of guilt or innocence by
a jury and a subsequent determination of punishment by a judge. Id. In contrast,
eighteenth century trials collapsed both stages into one and each offense mandated
a particular punishment. Id.
167 Douglass, supra note 135, at 2011 (citing Whitnan J. Hou, Capital
Retrials and Resentencing: Whether to Appeal and Resentencing Fairness, 16
CAP. DEF. J. 19, 30 (2003)); see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
289 (1976) ("At the time the [Bill of Rights] was adopted in 1791, the States
uniformly followed the common-law practice of making death the exclusive and
mandatory sentence for certain specified offenses." (citing HUGO ADAM BEDAU,
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 5-6, 15, 27-28 (rev. ed. 1967))). Blackstone
describes death by hanging, embowelment, or burning alive. 4 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 130, at *370. Punishment for other felonies included mutilation or
dismembering, slitting of the nostrils, branding of the hand, whipping, hard labor,
exile, banishment, loss of liberty, and temporary imprisonment. Id. Despite these
options, Blackstone made clear that the quantity or degree of punishment was
"ascertainedfor every offence; and that it [was] not left in the breast of anyjudge,
nor even of a jury, to alter that judgment." Id. at *371. Blackstone warned that
"if judgments were to be the private opinions of the judge, men would then be
slaves to their magistrates, and would live in society without knowing exactly the
conditions and obligations which it lays them under." Id.
168 Hessick & Hessick, supra note 164, at 51.
169 Id.
According to Hessick and Hessick, colonial era judges did not
conduct a formal sentencing proceeding. Id. Instead, the conviction determined
the punishment, as punishment for most crimes carried particularized sentences.
Id.; see also Douglass, supra note 135, at 2011 (cautioning against the temptation
to conclude that because the Sixth Amendment contemplated no separate
sentencing proceeding, it also contemplated no sentencing rights). See generally
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Professor John Douglass has opined that in the pre-founding
era, the alignment of punishment with the crime allowed the
defendant to precisely predict a sentence from the face of the
charging instrument.' 70 In this model of unitary prosecution,
sentencing evidence in felony cases was by necessity presentedand confronted--during the trial.1 72 This resulted in a more
determinate trial and sentencing procedure than that which exists
today. As posited by Douglass, "in both purpose and effect, the trial
was the sentencing."1 73 Hessick and Hessick extend Douglass's
reasoning to argue that in pre-founding felony cases "the process of

Bibas, supra note 156, at 46; Douglass, supra note 135, at 1972; Herman, supra
note 71, at 302-03; White, supra note 138, at 396.
170 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000); see also 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 130, at *369 (after verdict "the court must pronounce
that judgment, which the law hath annexed to the crime"); Bibas, supra note 156,
at 46, 48 (arguing that punishment was immediately imposed); Douglass, supra
note 135, at 1977 (describing English and early U.S. criminal law as dominated
by mandatory penalties, not sentencing discretion); White, supranote 138, at 397
(characterizing substantive criminal law as sanction-specific, which proscribed a
specific sentence for an offense); McMurray, supra note 141, at 592 (describing
sentences in the determinate era as corporal punishment or specific fine and
theorizing that, from the face of the charging instrument, defendants could predict
a sentence with precision).
I See Douglass, supra note 135, at 2008 ("The Framers lived in a system
of.. . litigation where a unitary trial and single jury verdict determined not only
guilt or innocence, but life or death as well. With that system as their point of
reference, they crafted a single set of adversarial rights to govern all of the
proceedings ... ."); see also White, supra note 138, at 397.
72 See Douglass, supra note 135, at 2008, 2016. The rules appeared to be
different for misdemeanors. Id. at 2016 (hypothesizing that in the late eighteenth
century, English and colonial U.S. judges "exercised a range of discretion in
choosing punishment for misdemeanants"); see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 480
n.7 (noting judges frequently imposed sentences of fines or whippings upon
misdemeanants).
1" Douglass, supra note 135, at 1972-73. Douglass argues that separating
the guilt determination from the choice of an appropriate penalty "was a procedure
that evolved after the founding, initially for noncapital sentencing." Id. at 197273, 2020; see also Hessick & Hessick, supra note 164, at 51 (describing prefounding sentencing as part of the trial); White, supra note 138, at 397 (noting
that pre-founding felony juries decided both the guilt and punishment).
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sentencing was virtually indistinguishable from the process of
conviction."l74
Bifurcated trials and sentencing1 7 5 was one of the most notable
post-founding developments that affected felony sentencing.1 76
Douglass opines that bifurcation evolved "from the parallel
movements towards judicial discretion and individualization." 7 7
Sentencing in the indeterminate era allowed broader discretion to
incarcerate convicted felons, unlike determinate-era sentencing

Hessick & Hessick, supra note 164, at 51.
See Douglass, supra note 135, at 2018-19. See generally Jenia
lontcheva,
Jury Sentencing as Democratic Process, 89 VA. L. REv. 311, 316-19, 314-30
(2003) (discussing the origin and decline of jury sentencing in the United States);
Alan C. Michaels, TrialRights at Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1814 (2003).
176 Another notable development was plea-bargaining. See Mary
E. Vogel,
The Social Origins of Plea Bargaining: Conflict and the Law in the Process of
State Formation, 1830-1860, 33 LAW & Socy REV. 161, 161, 174-75 (1999)
(noting the emergence of plea bargaining during the 1830s and 1840s); see also
Fisher, supra note 137, at 22 (noting 1809 as the earliest example of clear plea
bargaining in the U.S. colonies). The adoption of adult parole and probation
services was another important post-founding development. See Sam B. Warner
& Henry B. Cabot, Changes in the Administrationof CriminalJustice During the
Past Fifty Years, 50 HARV. L. REV. 583, 599 (1937). Warner and Cabot discuss
the creation of reformatories for young male offenders and argue that adoption of
the indeterminate sentence model and parole law occurred together. Id. While
the sentencing judge decided the length of punishment, the parole board decided
the date of release. Id. at 607. Warner and Cabot discuss the first instances of
probation, which occurred in Massachusetts during the seventeenth century. See
id. at 598-99. Warner and Cabot found that by 1910, twenty states had adopted
adult probation statutes. Id. Warner and Cabot indicated that the duty of the
probation officer was to furnish the judge with information about a defendant's
criminal history. Id. at 607; see also Ricardo J. Bascuas, The American
Inquisition: Sentencing After the Federal Guidelines, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1, 11 (2010) (discussing early history of statutory of probation in the federal
system).
" Douglass, supra note 135, at 2019. Douglass suggests that bifurcation
was the result of the need to separately consider sentencing evidence that would
have been inadmissible at trial. Id. at 2018-19. Douglass postulates that the rules
of evidence conflicted with the emerging preference for making punishment fit
not only the crime but also the individual criminal. Id. According to Douglass,
evidence of bad character would be considered unfairly prejudicial and
inadmissible at trial. Id.
174
15
1
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where the punishment for most felonies was death."' McMurray
observed that indeterminate-era sentencing also required a judicial
determination of the length of imprisonment, which by necessity
compelled consideration of the nature of the offense and the unique
circumstances of the individual.1 79 Douglass has posited that the
information needed by indeterminate-era judges-which was
presented during a separate sentencing process-differed in quantity
and type from their determinate-era counterparts. 80 Professor
Susan Herman has hypothesized that while the exact causation is
unclear, the advent of offender-oriented indeterminate sentences
established sentencing as a distinct procedural phase of the "criminal
prosecution." 18 Professors Sam B. Warner and Henry B. Cabot also
observed that once guilt was entered in an indeterminate-era felony
case, there were few controls to limit the sentencing judge's
discretion to decide a defendant's punishment.' 8 2
Like bifurcation, guilty pleas also flourished during the
indeterminate era. While there is some evidence of guilty pleas prior
to the founding, Professor Mary Vogel described guilty pleas as rare
in English common law cases and infrequent in colonial America. 18 3
Vogel's comprehensive study of the emergence of guilty pleas in the
U.S. criminal justice system demonstrates that by the late 1830s in
Boston, guilty pleas began to appear in significant numbers in
common law-based cases, and that ten years later they were
accepted for virtually every sort of offense.184 According to Vogel,

18

Id. at 2016-17. White hypothesizes that the nineteenth century saw both
the creation of felony sentencing discretion and the division of felony trials into
separate guilt and sentencing phases. See White, supra note 138, at 397-98.
179 McMurray, supra note 141, at 592.
1so Douglass, supra note 135, at 2018. Douglass describes the newfound
ability to exercise discretion of indeterminate era judges and their ability to
individualize sentences. Id. Douglass extends this reasoning to argue that
indeterminate era judges "needed to know more about an individual than a trialor guilty plea-was likely to tell them" if they were to individually tailor
sentences. Id.
181 See Herman, supra note 71, at 302.
182 Warner & Cabot, supra note 176, at 606-07.
183 See Vogel, supra note 176, at 172; see also Fisher, supra note 137, at 22.
184 See Vogel, supra note 176, at 175. Vogel found a surge in guilty pleas
in the Boston Police Court docket from less than 15 percent in 1830, to 28.6
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guilty pleas were solidly institutionalized by the 1860s.15 By the
late nineteenth century, judges across the nation willingly engaged
in plea bargaining. 186 Even though pinpointing when guilty pleas
became common can be difficult,' by the 1920s, plea bargaining
was well established.' 8 8

Early plea bargaining did not necessarily develop at the
initiation of the prosecution or the defense. Justin Miller, an early
twentieth-century commenter on plea bargaining, suggested that
prosecutors may not have initiated plea offers or even participated
in plea negotiations.' 89 Miller observed that some trial judges
initiated early plea bargaining, which could have involved openly
negotiating in court with the accused' 90 or making offers of a
dismissal, a plea of guilty to a lesser offense, or a plea of guilty to
percent in 1840, 52 percent in 1850, 55.6 percent in 1860, and 88 percent in 1880.
Id.
` See id. at 174-75 (discussing early practice of plea bargaining in Boston).
116 Mnookin, supra note 4, at 1723, 1728.
'1 7 See Moley, supra note 187, at 106-07 (finding a generational increase in
the proportion of pleas).
188 Justin Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 2
(1927). Miller discussed the concept of forgiveness by an aggrieved person,
which he described as "condonation." Id. Miller argued that condonation was
long recognized by 1927 and that the practice was not intended to prevent
prosecutions. Id. Yet in practice, "condonation and compromise of criminal cases
[was] frequent and the methods of evading the clear purpose of the written law
[were] varied." Id.; see also Raymond Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. CAL. L.
REV. 97, 118 (1928). Moley found that by 1926 in Cook County, Illinois, 13,117
felony prosecutions entered preliminary hearing and 492 resulted in a complete
jury trial. Id. During the same year in Chicago, slightly more than one percent of
cases initiated as felonies resulted in a jury verdict of guilty on the felony charge.
Id. Moley does not specify whether the remaining cases were resolved by
dismissals, guilty pleas, or bench trials. Warner and Cabot argued that almost a
decade later there also appeared to be an increase in jury trial waivers, presumably
in favor of bench trials. See Warner & Cabot, supra note 176, at 592 (finding that
by the late nineteenth century, waiver ofjury trial in criminal cases was common
in few states, but that by 1937 it was permitted in the federal courts and those of
over half of the states).
189 Miller, supra note 187, at 8, 10.
19

o d.; see also Moley, supra note 187, at 103. Moley characterized guilty
pleas in early cases as favorable to both the prosecutor and the defense, neither of
whom would be "compelled to carry through an onerous and protracted trial." Id.
Moley also theorized that guilty pleas also allowed judges to escape the danger of
reversal on questions of law. Id.
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the charged offense. 19 1 Miller also observed that other trial judges
either refused to have any part in compromises or privately
expressed the propriety of a settlement to the parties. 192 Miller
commonly witnessed pleas in the following types of cases: desertion
or failure to provide for wife or children;' 9 3 violation of liquor
laws;1 9 4 automobile thefts;' 9 5 sex cases, including seduction and
statutory rape; 19 6 and larceny or accusations for issuing fraudulent
checks or obtaining money or property by fraudulent means.' 9 7
The rise in plea bargaining also coincided with increases in the
number of criminal offenses, which burdened enforcement
officials,1 9 8 courts,1 99 and the public. 20 0 Miller argued that the
"professional banditry of [the] scientific age" 2 0 1 combined with
inadequate law enforcement staff, equipment, and cohesive
administrative guidance and direction made it impossible for law
enforcement "to combat criminal activity." 2 0 2 Miller also argued
that improved means of transportation and communication brought
people closer together, multiplied frictions, and increased

'9'
192

Id. at 10.

Id.

Miller, supra note 187, at 12.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 14-15.
96
1 Id. at 15.
197 Id. at 16. Miller attributed the frequency of pleas in fraud cases to the
difficulty of securing convictions. Id. Miller also describes a prosecutorial
incentive to accept pleas to lesser crimes for purposes of avoiding the expense of
trials and the risk of acquittal. Id. at 15-16.
198 Id. at 19.
199 See Miller, supra note 187, at 20. Miller described courts as unable to
accommodate increased burdens of trial. Id. Miller also described jury duty as an
"irksome burden" on the public. Id. Mnookin argued that increased caseloads
significantly contributed to the judiciary's changing attitude about the merits of
negotiated pleas. Mnookin, supranote 4, at 1728; see also Warner & Cabot, supra
note 176, at 590 (discussing the striking growth in the number of cases per judge,
and finding that the number of judges did not keep pace with the growth of the
population).
200 Miller, supra note 187, at 12.
201 Id. at 19.
193

19 4
19 5

202

Jd

138

WIDENER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25

governmental supervision.2 0 3 Like Miller, Warner and Cabot
described the early twentieth century as one characterized by a
"recent revival . . of outlawry," which was attributed to large
increases in the number of petty offenses and the inability of the
courts and authorities to handle modern crime.20 4 Another early
twentieth-century commenter, J.C. McWhorter, lamented that the
public had become accustomed and listlessly indifferent to
lawlessness 20 5 due to unpunished crime becoming a "matter-ofcourse." 20 6
As the number of criminal acts began to increase, so too did the
role of counsel in felony cases. 2 0 7 The U.S. Constitution reflected
an early acceptance of the adversarial system and a rejection of the
English common law prohibition on defense counsel. 20 8 Randolph
N. Jonakait studied the emergence of colonial-era defense bars.20 9
Jonakait described the expertise developed by criminal defense
attorneys on substantive and procedural constitutional rights 2 10 as an
advantage for defendants. According to Jonakait, by the mideighteenth century, the acquittal rate for represented defendants in
New Jersey was seventy-seven percent, while the acquittal rate for
unrepresented defendants was merely eighteen percent.2 1' Jonakait
found that by 1810 almost every defendant in New York exercised
the right to representation by counsel. 212 The mere presence of
Id. at 18; see also J.C. McWhorter, Abolish the Jury, 29 W. VA. L. Q.
B. 97, 98 (1923) (opining that automobiles afforded criminals the ability to "play
hide and seek" with law enforcement).
204 Warner & Cabot, supra note 176, at 590, 595.
205 McWhorter, supra note 203, at 97.
&

203

206 Id.

Miller, supra note 187, at 16-18. Miller described the creation of new
laws that prohibited the manufacture and sale of liquor, regulated automobiles and
securities, and governed the issuances of checks and other evidences of value. Id.;
see also Warner & Cabot, supra note 176, at 585 (noting the increase in crimes
committed and prosecuted).
200 Randolph N. Jonakait, The Rise of the American Adversary System:
America Before England, 14 WIDENER L. REv. 323, 327-28 (2009).
209 See id. at 323, 327, 329, 331,
333.
210 See, e.g., id. at
333.
211 Id. at 330-31 (finding that mid-eighteenth century defendants
in colonial
New Jersey were roughly four times more likely to be acquitted if represented by
counsel).
2 12
Id. at 332-33.
207
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counsel did not mean that the adversarial system as we know it today
was in operation during the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. 2 13 The point here is that by the height of the indeterminate
era, the United States had developed a distinct adversarial system.
It should be noted that the expanded role of counsel in U.S.
criminal cases also overlapped with the recognition of the Sixth
Amendment's Counsel Clause as a fundamental felony sentencing
right in state and federal courts. 214 By the millennium, the Sixth
Amendment's Criminal Jury Trial Clause would also be deemed
applicable at felony sentencing. These developments provide
grounds to reevaluate the current rejection of confrontation as a
felony sentencing right, as such rejection occurred before the Sixth
Amendment was interpreted to apply to criminal defendants in state
courts.2 15

Supreme Court decisions regarding the scope of Sixth
Amendment rights at felony sentencing do not appear until the early
twentieth century, when in Johnson v. Zerbst2 16 the Court turned its
attention to the Counsel Clause. Without benefit of counsel,
Johnson was charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced in federal
district court.2 17 The Court ruled Johnson's conviction and sentence
could not stand under the Sixth Amendment because he was not
represented by and had not competently and intelligently waived
counsel.2 18 In the decades after Johnson, due process became the
213

Id. at 334.

214

Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S.
128,

136 (1967).

215 Berman, supra note 14, at 391.

304 U.S. 458 (1938).
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 460.
218 Id. at 468. Much of the Johnson Court's reasoning focused on the
significant role of counsel in felony cases. Id. at 462-67. The Counsel Clause was
described as "one of the safeguards ... deemed necessary to insure fundamental
human rights of life and liberty." Id. at 462. If counsel were unavailable, the right
to be heard would mean little as defendants were in need of the "guiding hand of
counsel at every step of the proceedings." Id. at 463. Counsel's purpose was to
protect defendants from conviction and sentences that could result from their own
ignorance of legal and constitutional rights. Id. at 465. Ten years later, the Court
affirmed Johnson in Townsendv. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948), but declined to hold
that counsel was required in all cases. Instead, Townsend reasoned that the
conviction and sentence were predicated on misinformation or a misreading of
216

217
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vehicle through which the Sixth Amendment and virtually all Bill of
Rights protections were interpreted to apply to criminal defendants
in state courts. 2 19 However, the Sixth Amendment was not
incorporated in whole. 22 0 hiterpretations of what due process
required varied between the Amendment's clauses, 22 1 each of which
had to be separately deemed fundamental or essential to a fair
trial.2 22 Additionally, some clauses were deemed only to apply at
the trial stage of the criminal prosecution, while others applied
beyond the trial. With regard to sentencing rights, the Confrontation
Clause provided the least protection (actually none).2 2 3 Long before
incorporation, the Counsel Clause provided the broadest
protection,2 24 and as held in Gideon v. Wainwright, was interpreted
to apply at all critical stages of federal criminal prosecutions.2 2 5
Johnson embodies the Court's case-by-case approach to
whether the lack of counsel at state and federal sentencing hearings

court records that could have been prevented had counsel been provided. Id. at
741.
219 Berman, supra note 14, at 391.
220 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963) (holding
that
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause makes the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel obligatory on the states); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406
(1965) (incorporating the Confrontation Clause); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 149 (1968) (incorporating the Jury Trial Clause).
221 Chhablani, supra note 15, at 520-21 (discussing interpretations of the
"criminal prosecution" as dependent on the procedural right at issue and
advocating for a broad definition of the term).
222 See, e.g., Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404 (holding that the appearance of
confrontation rights in the Sixth Amendment's text reflects the Framers' belief that
"confrontation was a fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a criminal
prosecution"); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 ("[W]e believe that trial by jury in
criminal cases is fundamental to the U.S. scheme ofjustice . . . ").
223 Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 211 (1972) (holding that confrontation
only applies to trials). See generally Michaels, supra note 175, at 1779-81
(comparing the Court's interpretation of "criminal prosecution" between the
clauses of the Sixth Amendment itself and between the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments).
22 4
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134-36 (1967) (reasoning that Gideon did
not enumerate the various stages in a criminal proceeding where the right to
counsel applied and holding that counsel was required at every "critical stage" of
the criminal prosecution, including sentencing and probation hearings).
225 See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343-45.
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violated due process. 226 After Johnson but before Gideon, the Court
squarely rejected the trial-right-only theory of the Counsel Clause in
Moore v. Michigan227 and held that counsel's representation was not
confined only to the trial. 228 After Gideon, Mempa v. Rhay applied
the Counsel Clause to an array of post-conviction proceedings,
including sentencing, appeals, and probation hearings.2 2 9
Mempa remains the preeminent case discussing the application
of the Counsel Clause at felony sentencing proceedings in state and
federal courts. 2 3 0 Mempa involved unrelated convictions of two
defendants who pled guilty in Washington state court on the advice
of counsel. 23 1 Both defendants were sentenced to terms of
imprisonment and released on probation under Washington's
deferred sentencing statutes.2 3 2 Washington moved to have the
probations revoked because both defendants allegedly committed
other crimes after their initial release.2 3 3 Neither defendant was

See, e.g., Johnson, 304 U.S. at 468 ("[T]he Sixth Amendment stands as a
jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence. . . ") (emphasis added); see
also Townsend, 334 U.S. at 739-41 (holding that due process does not allow a
defendant to be sentenced on an untrue record, especially where the assistance of
counsel could have prevented the court from proceeding on false assumptions).
227 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
The Moore Court famously held that the Sixth
Amendment's Counsel Clause was not confined to representation during the trial
on the merits. Id. at 160-65.
228
Id. at 160. Moore was a seventeen-year-old African-American male who
was charged with murdering an elderly Caucasian woman. Id. at 156. After
confessing to the murder, Moore received a life sentence of solitary confinement
and hard labor. Id. Moore's conviction and sentence were appealed based on
Michigan's failure to provide Moore with the assistance of counsel during the plea
and sentencing hearings. Id. Michigan argued that the trial judge's inquiry into
the voluntariness of the plea fulfilled the state's constitutional duty. Id at 158.
The Court held that Moore fell within the class of cases in which the intervention
of counsel was an essential element of a fair hearing. Id. at 159. The fact that
Moore may have intelligently waived counsel was not outcome determinative. Id.
at 161. The assistance of counsel was of such critical importance as to be an
element of Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
229 Mempa, 389 U.S. at 134, 136.
230
Id. at 130.
231 Id. at 130-33.
232 Id.
226

233 [,]
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provided with counsel at his probation revocation hearing. 2 34 Both
were re-incarcerated on the grounds of a probation violation. 235 Both
defendants filed habeas petitions and claimed violations of the
Counsel Clause.2 36 The Court reversed the Supreme Court of
Washington's denial of habeas relief.2 37

Admittedly, Mempa does not answer the question whether the
Confrontation Clause applies at sentencing. But Mempa ultimately
rejected the trial-right-only theory of the Counsel Clause. Mempa
also acknowledged that post-trial proceedings could be of a critical
nature in a criminal case.2 38 In doing so, the Mempa Court was
unpersuaded by arguments that the revocation hearing was a mere
formality or that any violation of the Counsel Clause was remedied
because defendants were provided with the assistance of counsel at
the initial trial.23 9 Counsel was necessary at the revocation hearing
for marshaling and proving the facts, introducing evidence, and
generally aiding and assisting the defendants. 24 0 Fundamentally,
Mempa affirmed Gideon's mandate of counsel at every stage of the
"criminal prosecution" that implicated critical and fundamental
procedural and substantive rights.
Shortly after Mempa, scholars began to further question the lack
of other procedural and substantive rules governing the sentencing
hearings. 24 1 The Honorable Marvin E. Frankel, widely considered
234 Id.
235

Mempa, 389 U.S. at 130-33.

2361d.
2371d.

238

Id The Court also noted that lower courts had already ruled that the Sixth
Amendment Counsel Clause extended to sentencing in federal cases. Id. at 134
n.4 (citing Martin v. United States, 182 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1950); McKinney v.
United States, 208 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Nunley v. United States, 283 F.2d
651 (10th Cir. 1960)).
239 Mempa, 389 U.S. at 135.
240 Id.
241 Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing,
41 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 5,
7-8, (1972); see also United States v. Clark, 792 F. Supp. 637, 650 (E.D. Ark.
1992) (citing Supplementary Report of Sentencing Commission, dated June 18,
1987, at 3 n. 15). Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg has hypothesized that the absence
of criminal sentencing standards in the indeterminate era gave rise to arbitrariness.
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Due Process, History, and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 243, 243 (2001). Such arbitrariness was compounded by the
absence of rules of evidence and standards of proof. Id.
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the father of modem sentencing reform, lamented wide disparities
in punishment, which he argued substantively "turned arbitrarily
upon the variegated passions and prejudices of individual
judges." 242 Judge Frankel also noted the absence of procedural
rules 2 4 3 and the limited role of appellate courts, which had authority
to review sentences only on rare or extraordinary grounds.2 44 Judge
Frankel pondered whether the rehabilitative goals of indeterminate
sentencing were necessary and realistic 24 5 and noted that judges and
probation officers rarely communicated about a defendant or their
"treatment." 24 6 Finally, Judge Frankel described the trial court's
physical observations of the defendant as a minor and fleeting factor
at best; at worst, overdrawn and overweighed judicial folklore. 2 47
Critique of the lack of procedural and substantive criminal
sentencing rules would be partially addressed in In re Winship, 2 4 8
Mullaney v. Wilbur,249 and Patterson v. New York. 250 Winship
dubbed the reasonable doubt standard a protectant of the
presumption of innocence 2 51 and established that every fact
Frankel, supra note 241, at 5, 7-8; see also Douglas A. Berman,
Foreword:Beyond Blakely and Booker: PonderingModern Sentencing Process,
242

95 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 655 (2005) (finding that race, gender, and

socioeconomic status contributed to some outcomes and disparities).
243 Marvin E. Frankel, Sentencing Guidelines: A Need for Creative
Collaboration, 101 YALE L.J. 2043, 2044 (1992) (noting common use of uncross-examined information at sentencing hearings).
244 Frankel, supra note 241, at 5, 7, 23-24 (arguing that indeterminate era
sentences were unreviewable "if within the commonly extravagant bounds of the
statute," unless there were "egregious departures from lawful criteria"); see also
Saltzburg, supra note 241, at 243 (arguing that indeterminate era sentences were
"largely uncontrolled by appellate review" regardless of whether imposed by a
judge or by a jury).
245 Frankel, supra note 241, at 29-31; see also Douglas A. Berman,
Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender Characteristics in Modern
Sentencing Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REv. 277, 279 (2005).
246 Frankel, supra note 241, at 5, 10-12, 37-38 (describing the "poor
performance record" of probation offices and questioning the common practice of
separating questions of guilt from punishment).
247 Id. at 27.
248 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
249 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
250 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
251 Winship, 397 U.S. at 363.
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necessary to constitute the charged offense 252 must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.2 5 3 Winship remained silent on how to
determine which facts were necessary to prove the charge. 2 54 A
narrow approach was chosen in Mullaney, which only required

252 Id. at 358-59. Section 712 of the New York Family Court Act defined a

juvenile delinquent as "a person over seven and less than sixteen years of age who
does any act which, if done by an adult, would constitute a crime." Id. at 359.
Winship, a twelve-year-old male, and allegedly stole $112.00 from a woman's
pocket book. Id. at 359-60. Section 744(b) of the New York Family Code
required that "[a]ny determination at the conclusion of [an adjudicatory] hearing
that a [juvenile] did act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence."
Id. at 360. Winship received an eighteen-month sentence, which annually could
be extended until his eighteenth birthday. Id. at 359-60. The Appellate Division
of the New York Supreme Court affirmed without opinion. Id. at 360. See also
In re Samuel W, 24 N.Y.2d 196, 197, 299 N.E. 2d 253 (1969). The New York
Court of Appeals held that a lawyer's duty in a criminal case was to ensure
acquittals, a reduction of charges, or the minimization of punishment. Id. at 199.
In contrast, in ajuvenile proceeding the lawyer's duty was to act in the best interest
of the child. Id. Moreover, findings of guilt in juvenile adjudications were not
convictions that affected substantive or procedural rights or privileges. Id. at 200.
Additionally, juvenile convictions enjoyed the protective cover of confidentiality.
Id. Winship's case involved no deprivation of due process because delinquency
status was not a crime and juvenile proceedings were not criminal. Id. at 203.
Equal protection arguments also failed based on this distinction between juvenile
proceedings and adult criminal prosecutions. Id.
253 Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. Winship found that the requirement of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt dated at least to the founding and was long assumed
to be constitutionally required in criminal cases. Id. at 360, 362 (citations
omitted). But see id. at 377 (Black, J. dissenting) (doubting whether the
Constitution demanded guilt by proof beyond a reasonable doubt). The Winship
majority also found that at the time of the founding, guilt by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt was required in both delinquency proceedings against juveniles
and criminal proceedings against adults. Id. at 367-68. But see id at 377 (Black,
J. dissenting).
254 Id. at 364 (majority opinion); see also Ronald J. Allen et al., From
Winship to Apprendi to Booker: Constitutional Command or Constitutional
Blunder?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 195, 202 (2005); see generally, Stephanos Bibas,
JudicialFact-Findingand Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas,
110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1103 (2001); Leslie Yalof Garfield, Back to the Future:Does
Apprendi Bar a Legislature's Power to Shift the Burden ofProofAway from the
Prosecution by Labeling an Element of a Traditional Crime as an Affirmative
Defense, 35 CONN. L. REv. 1351, 1357 (2003).
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proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the "elements of the offense."2 5 5
Two years later, Pattersonexcluded facts that establish affirmative
defenses from the category of those that must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.256
Less than a decade after Winship, Mullaney, and Patterson,the
federal government and the states heeded calls for less judicial
discretion at criminal sentencing and established structured rules
that provided tougher appellate review of sentences. 257 The
Sentencing Reform Act 258 ("the SRA") was passed in 1984 and
would provide the blueprint for felony sentencing in federal courts.
The SRA created the United States Sentencing Commission ("the
Commission"), which was tasked with drafting the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines ("the Guidelines"). 25 9 The Guidelines rejected
255 Mullaney v.

Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).

The Mullaney Court

interpreted a Maine law that defined murder as an unlawful killing with malice
aforethought, which was presumed. Id. at 686 n.3 (quoting ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
TIT. 17, 2651 (West 1964)). A killing without malice aforethought was
manslaughter. Id. Maine argued that defendants should have the burden to prove
heat of passion, which would qualify the killing as manslaughter. Id. at 699. The
Court reasoned that Winship was not limited to "elements" as defined by state law.
Id. Accordingly, the prosecution has the burden to prove heat of passion beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id.
256 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 205-08.
Patterson distinguished between
affirmative defenses and statutory elements on the basis that affirmative defenses
did not allow the state to presume or infer any fact against a defendant. Id. See
also Nelson E. Roth et al., The Felony-MurderRule: A Doctrineat Constitutional
Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 462-63 (1985). Roth characterized the
tension between Mullaney and Patterson as "a dispute over how to delineate the
limits of a state's power to define the 'essential facts of a crime."' Id. Michaels
extends that reasoning to hypothesize that the constitutional presumption of
innocence did not apply at sentencing. Michaels, supra note 175, at 1778. See
generally Mark D. Knoll et al., Searchingfor the "Tail of the Dog": Finding
"Elements"of Crimes in the Wake of McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 22 SEATTLE U.
L. REv. 1057, 1081 (1999) ("Pattersonopened the door for creative legislatures
to evade the fundamental protections afforded in Winship by carefully drafting
their statutes.").
257 Berman, supra note 14, at 394; Frankel, supra note 241, at 54.
258 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
title II, Pub. L. No. 98-473,
98 stat. 1976 (1984).
259 Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1988); see
also Saltzburg, supra note 241, at n.2 (citations omitted).
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rehabilitation as the central principle for sentencing and expressly
called for sentences the provided "just punishment." 260 The
Guidelines calculated punishment by assigning points to specific
factS 2 6 1 about the offender and the offense. 2 6 2 The Guidelines were
mandatory; sentencing courts were required to explain the basis for
departures from the applicable range of punishment 263 and appellate
courts were granted increased authority to review sentences. 264
Structured sentencing rules were tested in McMillan v.
Pennsylvania,265 which challenged Pennsylvania's Mandatory
Minimum Sentencing Act ("the Act").2 66 The Act imposed a
minimum sentence of five years for offenses committed while in
"visible possession" of a firearm.2 6 7 In making this finding, the Act
permitted sentencing judges to consider evidence already introduced
at trial as well as evidence produced for the first time at
sentencing.268 If the firearm enhancement was proven by a
preponderance of the evidence, the Act divested sentencing judges
of discretion to impose a sentence of less than five years. 269
Presumably, sentences in excess of the statutory maximum also
were not authorized. 2 70 Four Pennsylvania sentencing judges
refused to apply the firearm enhancement because it did not allow
the jury to evaluate visible possession. 2 7 ' The McMillan Court
Berman, supra note 245, at 280; see also Kyron Huigens, Solving the
Williams Puzzle, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1052 (2005) (discussing policy
arguments for discretionary and guidelines sentencing).
261 Breyer, supra note 259, at 7-8.
Categories and sentence length were
260

determined by an analysis of 10,000 actual cases. Id. at 7. See also Becker, supra
note 12,at 158.
262 Breyer, supra note 259, at 5. See also Bascuas, supra note 176, at 8-9
(discussing guidelines methodology) and Becker, supra note 12, at 158 (same).
263 Breyer, supranote 259, at 5; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the
Jury: The CriminalJury's ConstitutionalRole in an Era ofMandatorySentencing,
152 U. PA. L. REv. 33, 93 (2003).
264 Breyer, supra note 259, at 5-6; see Bascuas, supra note 176, at 28
(discussing standard of review under federal guidelines).
265 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
266 Breyer, supranote 259, at 3; Berman, supra note 14,
at 394.
267 McMillan, 477 U.S. at
80.
268 Id.
269

Id.

2 70

Id.
Id. at 82-84.

271
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coined the term "sentencing enhancement, "272 which was
distinguishable from an "offense element," and held that state
legislatures had authority to designate certain facts as
"enhancements." 27 3 McMillan established the element/enhancement
distinction as the constitutional limit to legislative authority, 274 but
allowed state legislatures to designate which facts were elements or
enhancements. 2 75
By the millennium, Jones v. United States 2 76 limited McMillan
to require Congress and state legislatures to include traditional
elements in the definition of crimes.27 7 The next year, in Castillo v.
United States, 27 8 the Court appeared to provide a framework to
distinguish between "traditional elements" and sentencing

272 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 500 (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing
sentencing enhancements as a special fact spawn by McMillan); Knoll, supra note
256, at 1058 (describing McMillan as birthing the "sentencing factor."). See also
Fisher, supra note 6, at 62 (defining a sentencing factor as a fact which the
legislature deems should increase a defendant's sentence).
273 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85-86. According to the McMillan majority,
Pennsylvania did not disregard the presumption of innocence. Id. at 86-87.

Pennsylvania in fact created no presumptions. Id. Nor did Pennsylvania relieve
the prosecution of its burden of proof, alter the maximum penalty for the crime
committed, or create a separate offense calling for a separate penalty. Id. at 8788. Finally, Pennsylvania retained the definition of any existing offense. Id. at
88-90. See also Bibas, supra note 254, at 1106 (detailing factors supporting the
Apprendi Court's finding that the sentencing enhancements were
unconstitutional).
274 McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85-88.
275 Id. at 85 (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201-02) (holding that states
normally have authority to regulate procedures, including the burdens of
production and persuasion). See also Berman, supra note 14, at 399.
276 526 U.S. 227 (1999). Jones was convicted of violating the federal
carjacking statute which carries a maximum 15-year sentence. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2119(l)-(3) (1996). If at sentencing serious bodily injury is found, a 25-year
sentence could be imposed. Jones, 526 U.S. at 230-31.
277 Id. at 231-44. Jones held section 2119 defined three separate offenses
and that each must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id at 231-39. The
Court noted that its holding was not a matter of constitutional law, but of statutory
interpretation. Id. at 252 n. 11. See also Andrew Levine, The Confounding
Boundaries of 'Apprendi Land': Statutory Minimums and the FederalSentencing
Guidelines, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 377, 398 (2002).
278 530 U.S. 120 (2000).
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enhancements. 280 Castillo was indicted for conspiring to murder
federal officers in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), which
prohibited the use or carrying of a "firearm" in relation to a crime of
violence. 281 Penalties increased dramatically when the firearm was
a "machine gun." 282 The CastilloCourt held that the "machine gun"
finding constituted an element of a separate offense, 28 3 despite
Congress's designation of firearm type a sentencing enhancement.2 84
Jones and Castillo did little to calm the escalating tension
between the Jury Trial Clause and McMillan's broad grant of
legislative authority to choose between elements and enhancements.
The debate focused on procedural and substantive characteristics of
felony sentencing at the time of the founding. 285 Additionally, a
slight majority of the Court had come to believe Douglass's
hypothesis that in the pre-founding era, a pre-determined sentence
resulted 2 8 6 once the jury found guilt. 2 8 7 This majority also believed
2 80

281

Id. at 124-31.
Id. at 122.

282 Id.
2 83
284

Id. at 121.
Id. at 124. The Castillo Court made five specific findings to support its

holding that the type of firearm was an offense element rather than a sentencing
enhancement. Id. First, the statute listed the basic offense elements in the first
sentence and the sentencing enhancements in the remaining subsequent sentences.
Id. at 124-25. Second, the type of firearm had not typically or traditionally been
a sentencing factor because it neither involved characteristics of the offender nor
special features the offense. Id. at 126-27. Third, to ask a jury, rather than the
judge, to determine the type of firearm would rarely complicate trial or result in
unfairness. Id. at 127-28. Fourth, the legislative history did not support
interpreting section 924(c) as setting forth sentencing factors. Id. at 129-30.
Finally, the twenty-five year increase attached to the machine gun finding was
extreme. Id. at 131.
285
See generally Donald A. Dripps, The ConstitutionalStatus ofReasonable
Doubt Rule, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1665, 1701 (1987); Herman, supra note 71, at 32325, 328, 344; Knoll, supra note 256, at 1061-62, 1067-68, 1078-79 (discussing
the historical distinction between an offense and its elements, as well as elements
and enhancements).
286 See Douglass, supra note 135, at 2011 (citing Hou, supra note 167, at
30).
287 White, supra note 138, at 396 (describing modem day trials as bifurcated
processes whereby a jury determined guilt or innocence and the judge determined
punishment); Douglass, supra note 135, at 1968 (describing trials as a highly
structured and elaborate body of precedent defining substantive rights and
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the Sixth Amendment's text and structure reflected pre-founding
determinate "jury sentencing" in felony cases. 2 88
On the day Castillo ruled firearm type an element under section
924(c), Apprendi v. New Jersey overturned a sentence that was also
based, in part, on post-verdict judicial fact-finding. 289 Apprendi was
convicted under a New Jersey statute that classified unlawful
possession of a firearm a second-degree offense. 290 Punishment
ranged between five and ten years.2 9 ' Under a separate statute, New
Jersey extended the term of imprisonment for possession of a
firearm while committing a racially motivated crime. 292 The racial
motive or "hate crime" enhancement only need be proved to a
sentencing judge by a preponderance of the evidence and increased
punishment to a range of ten to twenty years. 293 Apprendi pled
guilty to the firearm violation and was never charged with any type
of hate crime. 294 The sentencing judge imposed a twelve-year
sentence based on the finding that Apprendi's acts were racially
motivated.2 9 5 The Supreme Court of New Jersey, relying on
McMillan, affirmed and held that a finding on motivation was
nothing more than a traditional sentencing enhancement. 2 96
The Apprendi Court qualified McMillan's longstanding
deference to legislative choice between elements and enhancements.
Apprendi reasoned that the right to a jury determination of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the crime was a

describing sentencing as informal, free-flowing, and applying few hard rules).
According to Douglass, "few 'trial rights' survive intact after a guilty verdict." Id.
288 Hessick & Hessick, supra note 164, at 51 (noting that founding era
sentencing schemes "presented no occasion to consider the extent to which
constitutional protections should be treated differently at sentencing than at
trial"); but see Fenner, supra note 26 at 37; see also King & Klein, supra note
165, at 1507-08.
289
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-90; see also Michaels, supra note 175, at 1814
n. 180 (citation omitted).
290
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468.
291
Id. at 468.
292 Id. at 468-69.
293 Id.
294
Id. at 469.
295 Id.
296
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471-74.
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historical foundation of the common law. 2 97 Reflecting on criminal
prosecutions at the time of the founding, the Court found that little
judicial discretion existed to alter punishment because criminal laws
were sanction-specific. 2 98 Additionally, guilt and punishment were
invariably linked, and there was no distinction between an element
and an enhancement. 29 9 In the Court's view, even though the
practice of unitary trial and sentencing may have changed,
"modern
300
principles."
basic
these
to
adhere
still
courts must
Apprendi also found that because the jury trial right was one of
surpassing importance in the common law, 30 1 there was no
"principled basis for treating [enhancements and elements]
differently." 30 2 Guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was designated a
historically significant companion right to a jury verdict. 3 0 3 Both
reflected "a profound judgment about the way in which law should
be enforced and justice administered." 304 Apprendi limited
McMillan to the extent that designating certain facts elements 305
rather than enhancements could thwart Winship.3 06 To combat
circumvention of Winship, Apprendi embraced a principle
foreshadowed a year earlier in Jones 3 0 7 : "any fact [other than a prior
conviction] that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 308 By its terms, Apprendi
297 Id. at 477 (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 130, at *343).
298 Id.
299

at 479 (citations omitted).
Id. at 485.
300 Id. at 483-84 (emphasis added); but see id. at 518 (Thomas,
J.,
concurring) (describing Apprendi as a return to the status quo and a reflection of
the Sixth Amendment's original meaning, rather than a sharp break from the past).
301 Id. at 476. (majority opinion)
302

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476.
Id. at 478.
3 Id.
30
s Id. at 485;
303

see also Knoll, supranote 256, at 1114 (" Winship lives again").
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484-86 & 487 n. 13 (noting the unconstitutionality
of a legislature's removal from the purview of the jury "the assessment of facts
that increase the prescribed range of penalties"); see also Fisher, supra note 6, at
56 (describing the firearm enhancement as a classic example of an aggravated
crime and characterizing Apprendi as a very easy case).
307 See Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6.
30
sApprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (citation omitted); see also Knoll, supra note
256, at 1114 (hypothesizing that Jones adopted a Sixth Amendment constitutional
306

2016]

THE VALUE OF CONFRONTATION

151

applied only when post-verdict judicial fact-finding involved
imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory
maximum. 30 9 Without reference to Castillo, Apprendi ruled that
motivation required a jury determination of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.3 10
A broad reading of Apprendi seemed to require a jury
determination of all facts that increase the punishment, which would
fundamentally implicate structured sentencing schemes like the
Guidelines. At least one member of the Apprendi majority rejected
this view; one dissenter predicted the threat. 3 1 1 Arguments that
McMillian authorized legislatures, not sentencing commissions, to
choose between elements and enhancements strengthened after
Apprendi.3 12 The Guidelines and other structured sentencing
schemes were alleged to have confined judicial discretion too

rule based on the right to a jury trial and precluding "the -designation as a
sentencing factor any item that would significantly increase the sentence").
309
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487 n.13. See also Levine, supra note 277, at 405.
310 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 475-76 ("The question whether [Mr.] Apprendi
had a constitutional right to have a jury find such bias on the basis of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt is starkly presented.") (emphasis added).
311 Compare Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523 n.I1 & 13 (Thomas, J., concurring),
with id at 552 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also Alex Ricciardulli, The U.S.
Supreme Court's Surprise Ruling on Sentence Enhancements, 23 Los Angeles
Lawyer 15, 15 (2000). Ricciardulli characterized Apprendi as a big a case that
received little attention. Id. Ricciardulli also predicted that the Guidelines did
not implicate Apprendi unless a sentence greater than the maximum authorized
by statute was imposed. Id. Ricciardulli explained that laws that merely allowed
increases in punishment within the statutory range fell within Apprendi's limiting
principle. Id. at 16. "Laws that allow increases beyond the range, on the other
hand, are in trouble." Id See also Herman, supra note 71, at 296-97, 336-37
(questioning the applicability of McMillan to the issue of the constitutionality of
the Guidelines).
312 Id
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greatly, 3 3 which in turn lead to increased prosecutorial authority 3 14
and harsher punishment.3 15 Apprendi supported arguments that
structured sentencing was a "trial-like enterprise" 3 16 and that
McMillian's elements/enhancement distinction violated the Jury
Trial Clause. 3 17 Notable critic of structured sentencing, Professor
Douglas Berman, argued that the Guidelines failed to provide
constitutional
procedural
and
substantive
comprehensive
protections.

318

313 See, e.g., KATE STITH & JosE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 78-103 (1998) (exploring
detriments of limited judicial sentencing discretion contained in the federal
sentencing guidelines); Michael Tonry, Mandatory Minimum Penalties and the
U.S. Sentencing Commission's 'Mandatory Guidelines,' 4 Fed. Sentencing Rep.

129, 132, 133 n.12 (1991) (identifying limited judicial discretion as a grievance
with the federal sentencing guidelines) (citations omitted).
314 Saltzburg, supra note 241, at 248, 251 & n.19; see also Albert W.
Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Pleafor Less Aggregation,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 926 (1991) (discussing increased prosecutorial discretion
within the federal sentencing guidelines); Bradford C. Mank, Rewarding
Defendant Cooperation Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Judges vs.
Prosecutors,26 CRIM. L. BULL. 399, 402-04 (1990) (discussing issues related to
increased prosecutorial discretion within the federal sentencing guidelines);
Bascuas, supra note 176, at 12-13 (discussing the role of the probation officer
within the federal sentencing guidelines as one that shifted from social worker to
range compotator). Bascuas also discusses the presentence report's transformation
from an instrument of potential mercy and mitigation to an instrument of
inquisition and punishment. Id.
3 Barkow, supra note 263, at 85-87; Bascuas, supra note 176, at 37-38.
See also Susan R. Klein, The Return of FederalJudicialDiscretion in Criminal

Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REv. 693, 708 (2005).
316 Berman, supra note 245, at 285; Berman, supra note 14, at 396-97. See
also Mark Chenoweth, Using its Sixth Sense: The Roberts Court Revamps the
Rights of the Accused, 2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 223, 239-40 (2009) (concluding
that removal of basic fact-finding from criminal juries violated Apprendi);
Huigens, supra note 260, at 1062, 1069-73 (distinguishing between indeterminate
and guidelines sentencing and theorizing that guidelines sentencing involves
resolution of factual disputes in a way that more resembles the trial process).
317 Barkow,
supra note 263, at 109-12 (arguing that the factual
determinations required by the federal sentencing guidelines were traditionally
made by juries); Berman, supra note 245, at 286 (arguing that guidelines
sentencing schemes "changed the landscape" to fixing punishment to such an
extent that Sixth Amendment principles were implicated).
318 Berman, supra note 245, at 659-60, 672 (exploring the federal sentencing
guidelines and their lack of procedural and substantive limitations). See also Stith
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Notwithstanding critique of the Guidelines by Berman and
others, a plurality of the Court affirmed McMillan's
elements/enhancements distinction in Harris v. United States.3 1 9
Harrisinvolved whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) defined a single crime,
to which brandishing is a sentencing factor that may be considered
by a judge after the trial, or multiple crimes, to which brandishing is
an essential element that must be proved to a jury.3 20 In its
indictment, the prosecution neither alleged brandishing nor
referenced the subsection of the code that specifically mentioned
brandishing. 3 2 1 Instead, the indictment charged that Harris
knowingly carried a firearm during and in relation to a drug
trafficking crime. 3 2 2 Harris was sentenced to seven years3 23 based
on the finding at the sentencing hearing that he brandished a
firearm. 3 2 4 The Fourth Circuit ruled brandishing a sentencing factor,

et al., supra note 270, at 154; Herman, supra note 71, at 315; THOMAS W.
HUTCHINSON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING LA WAND PRACTICE § 6Al .3 (1998).
319

536 U.S. 545, 550, 560-61, 568-69 (2002) (relying on McMillan and

holding Apprendi does not extend to judicial fact-finding necessary for the
imposition of a mandatory minimum penalty).
320
Id. at 549-50. Section 924(c) provided in relevant part:
[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm, or who, in
furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to
the punishment provided for such crime ofviolence or drug trafficking
crime(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years;
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not less than 10 years.
Id.

321 Id. at 551.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Id.
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as had every other federal circuit court to address the question. 3 25
The plurality agreed.3 26
Harris grounded itself on McMillan's broad grant of legislative
authority to determine which facts are offense elements and which
facts are sentencing enhancements. 3 27 The plurality acknowledged
that section 924(c)(1)(A) did not explicitly designate brandishing an
element or sentencing factor, but offered two competing
interpretations of the statute. One, that section 924(c)(1)(A) is
structured like most federal statutes, which list the offense elements
in a single sentence and the separate sentencing factors into
subsections.3 28 Or two, section 924(c)(1)(A) is a statute that appears
to list all offense elements in a single sentence, but nevertheless
should be interpreted as setting out the elements of multiple
offenses. 329 The plurality identified two "critical textual clues" to
distinguish between its two interpretations. First, historically
Congress had not treated brandishing as an offense element. 330
Second, the two-year increase for brandishing was insignificant.3 3 1
Harris also distinguished between McMillian-type facts that
increase the mandatory minimum sentence and Apprendi-type facts
that increase the mandatory maximum sentence.3 3 2 The plurality
denied there was a fundamental inconsistency between Apprendi
and McMillian. The Framers would have considered an Apprendi
fact an element of an aggravated offense and thus the domain of the
jury. Facts that trigger a mandatory minimum sentence, like that
at issue in McMillian and Harris, cannot make the same claim
Harris,536 U.S. at 552-53 (designating brandishing a sentencing factor).
See also United States v. Barton, 257 F.3d 433, 443 (5th Cir. 2001); United States
v. Carlton, 217 F.3d 986, 989 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Pounds, 230 F.3d
1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2000).
326 Harris,536 U.S. at 552-53.
327
Id. at 552-56.
328 Id. at 552-53.
329 Id. at 553-54.
330 Id.
I" Id. at 554-55. The Harrisplurality described the two-year increase as
"consistent with traditional understandings about how sentencing factors operate"
and "precisely what one would expect" when designating matters for a sentencing
judge's consideration when fixing punishment. Id. at 554.
325

332

Id. at 557-58.

33

Harris, 536 U.S. at 557.
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because the jury's verdict would have authorized imposition of the
minimum punishment with or without the finding. 3 34 Judicial factfinding in the course of selecting a sentence outside the authorized
maximum range implicates the Sixth Amendment.3 3 5 As even
Apprendi acknowledges (albeit in a footnote), only increases in the
penalty above what the law provides function like traditional
elements. 336 Thus, only "those facts setting the outer limits of a
sentence .. . are the elements of the crime for the purposes of the
constitutional analysis." 3 3 7

Despite Harris, the Court declared Apprendi applied more
broadly to state and federal sentencing guidelines in Blakely v.
Washington. The Blakely Court invalidated a thirty-seven month
enhancement for "deliberate cruelty" on the grounds that the
determination was not made by a jury. 338 The next year, the Court

334Id.

335
336

Id. at 558.

Id. at 562-64 (citingApprendi, 530 U.S. at487, n.13 ("We do not overrule

McMillan. We limit its holding to cases that do not involve the imposition of a
sentence more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense established by
the jury's verdict")).
33

1 Id.

at 567.

542 U.S. 296 (2004). Washington's sentencing guidelines permitted
departures from the minimum guidelines range in an amount up to the maximum
guidelines range if the sentencing judge found appropriate mitigating or
aggravating circumstances by a preponderance. Id. at 298. See also Kevin R.
Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and ConstitutionalLaw at CrossPurposes, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1089 (2005) (citation omitted). The
sentencing judge was required to justify any departure writing and any
enhancement must be found by a preponderance of the evidence. Blakely, 542
U.S. at 298-99. The Blakely Court reasoned that the relevant 'statutory maximum'
for Apprendi purposes was not the maximum sentence after the additional facts,
but the maximum sentencing without the additional facts. Id. at 303. Such
additional facts must be found by a jury because they were essential to
punishment. Id. Blakely expressly declined to determine whether its reasoning
extended to the federal sentencing guidelines. Id. at 305 n.9, 313 (the federal
sentencing guidelines "are not before us, and we express no opinion on them.");
see generally Stephanos Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth Amendment and
Criminal Sentencing, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 785 (2008) (discussing state
sentencing models and finding that twenty-nine were unaffected by Blakely or
Booker); Fisher,supra note 6, at 56-57 (discussing the Blakely Court's reasoning
that Washington's sentencing guidelines undermined the framers' design); Reitz,
338
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considered whether the Guidelines were unconstitutional. 339 In
United States v. Booker, and its companion case United States v.
Fanfan, defendants received sentencing enhancements in federal
court based on amounts of drugs, role in the offense, and obstruction
of justice. 340 In separate majority opinions, the Booker Court ruled
the Guidelines violated the Apprendi rule, but not fatally so. 34 1 The
first Booker majority concluded that a jury determination of facts
that raised the sentencing ceiling was constitutionally protected as a
firmly rooted basic precept of the common law.34 2 This majority
held that for Sixth Amendment purposes, mandatory guidelines
implicated the Jury Trial Clause 343 but advisory guidelines did
not.344 The first Booker majority agreed with Blakely that the
statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes was "the maximum
sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." 345 The
Guidelines violated the Jury Trial Clause to the extent that judicial
fact-finding at sentencing hearings was required. The second
Booker majority focused on whether the Guidelines could be
remedied.3 4 6 Exercising its power of severability, the Court ruled

supra note 337, at 1086; Klein, supra note 314, at 709-12; Berman, supra note
245, at 674.
3 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
340 At sentencing, Booker received an enhancement for obstruction ofjustice
and an enhancement for possession of an additional 566 grams of crack. Booker,
543 U.S. at 226-28. Fanfan's jury found 500 or more grams of cocaine were
involved, but the sentencing court found Fanfan responsible for 2.5 kilograms of
cocaine powder and 261.6 grams of crack. Id. at 543 U.S. at 228-29. The
sentencing judge also found that Fanfan played a leadership role in the criminal
activity for which he was convicted. Id.
3" Booker, 543 U.S. at 244-45, 258-62; see also Timothy Lynch, One Cheer
for United States v. Booker, 2005 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 215, 215 (2005)
(describing the Booker oral argument as a direct reflection of the Court's reticence
to "untangle the knots" that existed between McMillan and Apprendi's
interpretations of the criminal jury trial right).
342 Booker, 543 U.S. at 230.
34 Id. at 233 (reasoning that advisory sentencing guidelines implicated no
Sixth Amendment principles).
31 Id. at 233 (reasoning that discretionary sentencing authority did not
require a jury determination of the facts relevant to punishment).
3 45
Id. at 232 (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303).
346
Id. at 244-45.
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that the mandatory nature of the Guidelines made them incompatible
with the federal constitution.34 7 Advisory guidelines and a
reasonableness standard of appellate review cured these
incompatibilities. 34 8
In 2013, the Court reconsidered the Harris plurality's
distinction between mandatory minimum and maximum sentences in
Alleyne v. United States.34 9 Alleyne involved the same federal
criminal statute as that at issue in Harris and asked the same
question as Harris:whether brandishing was an essential element or
a sentencing enhancement.3 5 0 Unlike Harris, Alleyne was charged
with brandishing a firearm. 35 1 However, the jury did not find
Alleyne guilty of that offense. 3 52 At sentencing, the district court
imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of seven years based on
the finding that by a preponderance of the evidence brandishing
occurred. 3 53 The Alleyne Court ruled that Apprendi encompassed
"not only facts that increase the ceiling, but . .. those that increase
the floor." 354

347 Id. at 258.

Booker, 543 U.S. at 261-63. The Apprendi rule was reinforced in
Southern Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012), when the Court
extended the Sixth Amendment Jury Trial Clause to criminal fines. Id. at 234849. Southern Union Co. involved the imposition of a $38.1 million fine under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA"), which set a
maximum fine of $50,000 per day of violation. Id. The trial jury was not asked to
determine the precise duration of the violation. Id. at 2349. At the sentencing, the
district court found that Southern Union Co. violated RCRA for 762 days. Id. The
circuit court ruled Apprendi applicable to criminal fines, creating a split among
the circuits. Id. (citing United States v. Pfaff, 619 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2010) (per
curiam) and United States v. LaGrou Distribution Sys., Inc., 466 F.3d 585 (7th
Cir. 2006)). The Court held that longstanding common-law practice would not
permit treating criminal fines differently than other forms of punishment. Id. at
2350-57.
3 49
Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155.
348

350 Id.
351 Id.
352

Id.

353

Id. at 2156.

354

Id. at 2158.
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Alleyne is premised on the "clear" relationship at common law
between crime and punishment. 5 Additionally, in the common law
a particular sentence was prescribed for a particular offense. 3 56
Alleyne reasoned that at common law the "legally prescribed"
penalty affixed to the crime included both ends of the punishment
range.35 7 Any fact that triggered both the mandatory (or statutory)
maximum and minimum sentence were "ingredients" of that
offense. 3 "s Alleyne recognized that elevating the low-end or "floor"
of a sentencing range heightened "the loss of liberty associated with
the crime" 3 59 and was as relevant as the high-end or "ceiling." 3 60
Apprendi's foundation was to ensure that a defendant can predict the
penalty from the face of the indictment, 361 which was a significant
return to founding-era practice. In the Alleyne Court's view,
expanding Apprendi to include facts necessary to increase the
mandatory minimum sentence allows a defendant to do so. 3 6 2
Alleyne also acknowledged judicial fact-finding at felony
sentencing as a post-founding development. At the time of the
founding, little judicial discretion existed to influence felony
punishment.
Offense conduct that merited punishment was
determined during the trial and sentencing only consisted of
announcing the judgment. Modem bifurcation of the trial and
sentencing stages of the criminal prosecution has shifted factfinding on offense conduct (and to a lesser extent offender
characteristics) into a structured sentencing hearing. Once guilt is
accepted (either as a result of a trial or a plea), sentencing becomes
the focus of all parties. Mempa establishes felony sentencing as a
critical stage of the criminal prosecution for which counsel is
necessary. Apprendi and its progeny, as most recently demonstrated

"'Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2158.
Id; see also JOHN H. LANGBEIN,

THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY ON
THE EVE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, IN THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE,
GERMANY 1700-1900, 36 (A. Schioppa ed. 1987).
356

"I Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2160.
358

Id. at 2160-61.

359

Id. at 2161.

360

Id.

36

1 id.

362 Id.

at 2163-64.
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in Alleyne, establish that the jury's fact-finding role also extends
beyond the trial stage of the criminal prosecution.
Despite Apprendi and Alleyne, the Sixth Amendment's
structurally identical Counsel, Jury Trial, and Confrontation Clauses
are interpreted differently with regards to their application at felony
sentencing. The rejection of confrontation as a felony sentencing
right continues to rest on the Williams Court's reasoning that "both
before and since the U.S. colonies became a nation, courts in this
country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing
judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of
evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of
punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law." 3 63 This
Article advocates acceptance of the Confrontation Clause as a
felony sentencing right. This Article urges state and federal courts
to allow cross-examination of testimonial statements that are
material to punishment and where cross-examination assists in
assessing truth and veracity. In the next part, this Article offers a
framework for recognition of confrontation rights at felony
sentencing.
III.

THE VALUE OF CONFRONTATION AS A FELONY SENTENCING

RIGHT

As demonstrated in Williams, many states and the federal
government once adopted highly discretionary felony sentencing
procedures 3 6 4 that adhered to "an emerging penology that focused

363 Williams, 337 U.S. at 246.
34 See Berman, supra note 245, at 654. Berman describes a "rehabilitative
medical model" that was "conceived and discussed in medical terms-with
offenders described as 'sick' and punishments aspiring to 'cure the patient."' Id.
(citing J.L. MILLER ET AL., SENTENCING REFORM: A REVIEW AND ANNOTATED

1-6 (1981)). In this scheme, sentencing judges and parole officers
were administrative decision makers who crafted individualized sentences
"almost like a doctor or social worker exercising clinical judgment." Berman,
supra note 245, at 655 (citing United States v. Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79,
83 (D. Mass. 2004)). See also Douglass, supra note 135, at 2018 n.295
(describing individualized punishment as reflective of a "scientific view that
crime was a form of sickness that might be cured with proper treatment of an
BIBLIOGRAPHY

individual");

SANDRA

SHANE-DUBOW
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on [individualized] punishment."3 65 Williams established that at the
height of the indeterminate era, sentencing courts had almost
absolute discretion to increase or decrease punishment within given
statutory ranges. 366 McMurray contends that in the Williams era,
judicial discretion was curbed only by the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual
punishment. 367 Unlike in the determinate era, where judges in
felony cases rarely engaged in post-verdict fact-finding to fix
punishment, 368 indeterminate era judges imposed sentences based
on judge-found facts and rarely sought guidance from the jury. 369
As demonstrated in Apprendi, by the millennium, felony
sentencing in state and federal courts shifted to a structured model
that imposed maximum and minimum punishment by assigning

SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, CONTENT, AND EFFECT

5-6 (1985); Hessick & Hessick, supra note 124, at 52; McMurray, supra note
141, at 592.
365 Douglass, supra note 135, at 2018 (citing BANNER, supra note 373, at
102-03).
366 Hessick & Hessick, supra note 164, at 52. Hessick and Hessick
hypothesize that discretionary sentencing schemes were originally premised on
the goal of rehabilitation. Id. A sentencing judge's assessment relied on specific
sentencing characteristics that would cure the criminal defendant's "lawbreaking
ways." Id. Sentencing characteristics included the defendant's age, prior criminal
history, employment history, family ties, educational level, military service, and
charitable activities. Id.
36 McMurray, supra note 141, at 592.
368 McMurray, supra note 141, at 592 (noting that confrontation at
sentencing was irrelevant under the determinate model because there was no factfinding at the time the sentence was announced and thus, no witnesses to
confront). Blackstone reported that for the most part punishment was "fixed and
determinate." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, supra note 130, at *371. Only in
exceptional cases did determinate era sentencing judges exercise discretion to
impose fines and determine the length of imprisonment. Id. See also Michaels,
supra note 175, at 1814-25, 1825 n.180.
369 Klein, supra note 314, at 697; Professor Jenia lontcheva has extensively
explore jury sentencing and has found that by 1796 only one state sentenced by
jury, that by 1919 only fourteen states sentenced by jury, and that by 2003 only
six states sentenced by jury. Iontcheva, supra note 175, at 354. But see Douglass,
supranote 135, at 2013-14 (describing the widespread practice ofjury sentencing
in capital cases during the U.S. colonial era).
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points to specific facts 3 70 about the offender and the offense."7
Apprendi held that "any fact [other than a prior conviction] that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt." 3 7 2 This Article questions whether the right to a
criminal jury trial is fully effective if counsel is unable to use the
best method of challenging the veracity of the evidence presented to
a jury.
Apprendi warned that modem courts must adhere to
constitutional principles 3 7 3 even though the practice of unitary trial
and sentencing may have changed. Alleyne provided a timely
reminder of the interrelatedness of the Sixth Amendment's Counsel,
Jury, and Confrontation Clauses.
The Guidelines allowed
reconsideration of Alleyne's acquitted conduct, specifically the
brandishing charge, as a category of "relevant conduct." 3 7 4 As a
result, the prosecution was allowed to re-allege brandishing as an
"enhancement" and prove it by a lower burden. Alleyne was
punished as if the jury actually found brandishing.3 7 ' Alleyne's
vigorous (and successful) defense of the brandishing "element" was

370 Breyer, supra note 259, at 7-8. In the federal sentencing guidelines, the
categories of offenses and sentence lengths were determined by an analysis of
10,000 actual cases. Id. at 7. See also Becker, supra note 12, at 158.
371 Breyer, supra note 259, at 5. See also Bascuas, supra note 176, at 8-9
(discussing guidelines methodology); Becker, supra note 12, at 158 (same).
372 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (citation omitted); see also Knoll, supra note

256, at 1114.
31 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483-84 (emphasis added).
374 Ngov, supra note 9, at 267 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006)).
3 Ngov, supra note 9, at 258-60 nn. 142-50, 242, 284 & 287 (discussing
the impact of acquitted conduct on subsequent proceedings, including probation
and revocation hearings). The Court has addressed the use of acquitted conduct
as a basis for punishment in a pre-Crawfordper curiam opinion that held use of
such information did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See generally
United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 155 (1997) (per curium) ("[A]n acquittal is
not a finding of any fact."). Ngov argues that even if acquittals do not prove actual
innocence, reconsideration of acquitted conduct is inherently unfair. Ngov, supra
note 9, at 242 (citing Barry L. Johnson, If at First You Don't Succeed-Abolishing
the Use ofAcquitted Conduct in Guidelines Sentencing, 75 N.C. L. REV. 153, 182-

83 (1996)).
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essentially rendered meaningless. 376 For the Alleyne Court, the
inherent unfairness of these procedures was no trivial matter and
from a sentencing perspective was quite troubling. 377 So too was
that fact that defense counsel was not allowed use of the most
effective tools to re-defend the brandishing allegation, namely
cross-examination of the testimonial statements that supported the
post-trial "finding" that brandishing occurred.
Crawford's return to founding-era principles on the issue of the
meaning and scope of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause
is more than just a cosmetic incarnation; rather, it is a recognition of
the fundamental importance and value of the right. In this respect,
Crawford and Davis provide a workable framework for the
application of confrontation at felony sentencing. In the same way
the Confrontation Clause was intended to prohibit ex-parte
examinations as evidence against the accused at trial, 37 8 So too
should the Confrontation Clause prohibit ex-parte examinations as
evidence against the accused at sentencing. Moreover, just as the
Confrontation Clause intended to prevent un-cross-examined
testimonial statements of absent witnesses at trial,3 79 so too should
the Confrontation Clause prevent un-cross-examined testimonial
statements of absent witnesses at sentencing. Finally, where at trial
"the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional
demands is . . . confrontation,"380 so too at sentencing should

confrontation be the preferred method of testing reliability.
This is not to say that confrontation should be required for all
felony sentencing evidence.
The Davis distinction between
testimonial and nontestimonial statements should be the first step in
determining whether an un-cross-examined statement should be
admitted for sentencing purposes. Accordingly, statements that are
susceptible to the confrontation requirement are those that are made
when (1) the circumstances objectively indicate that no ongoing
emergency existed and (2) the primary purpose of the interrogation
"6 Ngov, supra note 9, at 261, 267, 288, 291. Ngov argues that new
evidence should be presented to warrant or justify a court's reconsideration of
acquitted conduct. Id.
..
n Ngov, supra note 9, at 242 (citing Johnson, supra note 374, at 182-83).
378

37
30

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004).
Id. at 53-54.
Id. at 68-69; see also id. at 61.
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(or questioning) was to establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to a criminal prosecution should be limited.
Additionally, when determining whether to require crossexamination of testimonial statements at felony sentencing, two key
factors are the statement's materiality to punishment and whether
cross-examination will assist in assessing veracity or truth.
However, these are not the exclusive factors. Nor should there be a
sliding scale whereby the greater the statement's quantitative value
the more likely cross-examination assists in truth-finding. Both,
however, are important to a determination of whether crossexamination should be necessary for statements that are regularly
considered by sentencing courts.
The rationale for application of confrontation rights at felony
sentencing is particularly salient with two primary categories of
testimonial statements that are submitted for purposes of increasing
punishment at felony sentencing. The first category is testimonial
statements used to prove the existence of facts related to the
sentencing offense. The second category is testimonial statements
used to prove the existence of facts related to prove relevant
conduct. To be sure, prior convictions are material to punishment.
However, in most cases cross-examination of this category of
testimonial statements is unnecessary.
Prior convictions are
commonly proved by certified court records, which are nontestimonial and widely available electronically. Only in rare cases
will testimonial statements assist in an assessment of the truth of a
prior conviction.
Testimonial statements that are used to prove facts related to the
sentencing offense or offenses are material to punishment,
especially in the current pleabargaining system.3 82 Where facts are

381

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 819-20 (2006).

382 Scott & Stuntz, supra note 136, at 1921. Scott and Stuntz describe
modern plea-bargaining as one that at first glance appears to allow a promissory

exchange whereby a defendant waives their right to trial in exchange for the
prosecutor's recommendation of a specific sentence. Id. at 1953-54. Yet, argue
Scott and Stuntz, plea bargains are not enforced according to "garden-variety"
contract principles of offer and acceptance. Id. at 1954-55. While Scott & Stuntz
reject arguments that plea bargaining is socially and morally harmful, they note
that the bargaining process may be burdened by process defects. Id at 1919. For
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admitted by the defendant and entered into the record (or plea
agreement) at the time the plea is accepted, confrontation would do
little to assist in an assessment of truth and veracity. Additionally,
most police reports, victim and witness statements, and other
documents containing material facts should have been gathered
during the investigatory stage and are usually disclosed before the
plea.3 83 Thus, trial judges can ascertain the defendant's knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary acceptance of the statements' veracity in
the same manner as the court establishes the knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary waiver of other constitutional rights.
Unfortunately, many courts establish the facts material to the
sentencing offense after accepting the plea. 384 Allowing limited
cross-examination of testimonial statements to prove the facts
material to the sentencing offense lessens the risk that a defendant
will not get the agreement for which counsel bargained. In the plea
bargaining context, the difference between a good and bad deal
depends on defense counsel's knowledge of likely trial outcomes,
including the behavior of judges exercising their sentencing
example, defendants negotiate with the prosecutor but contract with the judge. Id.
While a prosecutor can promise to recommend a given sentence or sentencing
range, there is no guarantee that a defendant will actually receive that sentence.
Id. at 1954. The prosecutor's "offer" is nothing more than an invitation to
negotiate and the deal is sealed only when the parties appear before the court. Id.
A defendant who pleas bears the risk that the prosecutor's recommendation will
not be followed by the court and has a lower reliance on a prosecutor's promises,
which rarely include those related to veracity of testimonial statements regarding
the sentencing offense. Id. at 1953-56. Additionally, the bargain has a
presumption of enforceability and constitutes nothing more than "an agreement
by both sides to present the case to the sentencing judge in a particular way-from
the defendant's side, an agreement to plead guilty to specified offenses; from the
government's side, a promise to say (or to avoid saying) particular things at
sentencing." Id. 1917-19. Finally, a prosecutor can only recommend a sentence
to the judge, who alone determines punishment and unlike a prosecutor's
promises, a defendant's are rarely revocable after the plea has been entered. Id. at
at 1953-56. Thus, a defendant's promise to enter a plea is a somewhat one-sided
agreement. Id.
383
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i) . In federal cases, a document or object
is discoverable if "the item is material to preparing the defense." Id. This includes
documents or objects relating to guilt or innocence regardless of whether the
material is inculpatory or exculpatory or favorable or unfavorable. See Robert M.
Cary et al., Federal Criminal Discovery 92 (2011).
384 BOND, supra note 142, at 156-57.
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discretion, as well as defense counsel's sense of the going "market
price" for the crime. 385 Even though defense counsel may be well
positioned to have both kinds of information, the process suffers
from a lack of predictability-particularly for the defendant.
Resolution of the material facts constituting the offense does not
occur until after the plea and usually requires the use of testimonial
statements. 386 In this manner, the sentencing hearing itself becomes
quite similar to a trial, but, from the defendant's perspective, results
in sentencing by ambush. The inability to cross-examine testimonial
statements ties counsel's hands and leaves the defendant with no
meaningful opportunity to test the material evidence that supports
the punishment. Where the parties agree on the material facts,
inclusion of testimonial statements in the plea agreement reduces
these risks. Where the parties do not agree, cross-examination
should be allowed.
Like testimonial statements to prove conduct related to the
sentencing offense, testimonial statements to prove conduct relevant
to the offender are also material to punishment. In both state and
federal courts, "under the concept of relevant conduct, the
defendant's sentence can be increased by the consideration of
uncharged, dismissed, or even acquitted conduct."3 8 7 The
Guidelines place few limitations on the use of information
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a convicted
defendant.3 8 8 Sentencing courts can reach "far back in time" to
determine what conduct relates. to the defendant's convicted
offense. 389 Relevant conduct increases the offense level, 390 and
385
386

Scott and Stuntz, supra note 136, at 1959.

BOND, supra note 142, at 156-57 (noting that before accepting
at plea,

judges rarely make detailed inquiries regarding the factual basis that support the
plea).
387
Ngov, supra note 9, at 236-37.
38
1 Id. at 267 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3661
(2006)).
389 Ngov, supra note 9, at 237-38.
390 Three theories of offense level exist. See id. at 245-47.
The first is a
"pure charge" offense system imposes sentences that is based on the "offenses for
which a conviction was obtained." Id. at 246. The second is a "real offense
system" that "imposes punishment for all the circumstances underlying the
defendant's offense, regardless of whether the additional conduct amounted to
convictions or charges." Id. The third is the "modified real offense system" that
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according to Ngov, could potentially turn an initial sentence of
probation into a mandatory life sentence. 39 1
Cross-examination of testimonial statements that prove relevant
conduct aids the search for veracity, especially regarding dismissed
and uncharged conduct. It is less likely that testimonial statements
regarding dismissed and uncharged conduct have been tested by a
jury or admitted by the defendant at a trial or any other proceedings.
This evidence may include statements recorded by probation
officers during telephone interviews and signed witness statements
gathered by law enforcement or prosecutors. 392 In the federal
regime, the Guidelines were established to infuse structure and

takes into consideration the defendant's relevant conduct. Id. at 247. The United
States Sentencing Commission, which promulgated the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, adopted the modified real offense system Id.
391 Id. at 284-85. Ngov argues that relevant conduct can add up to eighteen
points to the base offense level for fraud or tax evasion, twenty points for theft,
and thirty-six points for drug offenses. Id. Ngov found that a thirty-six point
increase on a drug offense could turn an initial sentence of probation into a
mandatory life sentence. Id. See also United States v. Wong, 2 F.3d 927, 932
(9th Cir. 1993) (Norris, J., dissenting) (noting that relevant conduct roughly
doubled the defendant's sentence from eighteen months to thirty months); United
States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (involving a relevant conduct
enhancement that increased the sentencing range from two to three years to twenty
to twenty-five years). Ngov argues that offense sentencing of both uncharged and
unconvicted conduct results in the harshest penalties outside of capital
punishment, including life sentences. See Ngov, supra note 9, at 239-49.
Moreover, "the determination of facts that underlie relevant conduct can be made
without affording the defendant the rights and procedures normally accorded at
trial" such as the right to confront witnesses and a right to a jury determination of
facts. Id. at 248. Nor do the rules of evidence apply. Id.
392 See United States v. O'Meara, 895 F.2d 1216, 1223 (8th Cir. 1990)
(Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[I]t is a sad but true fact of
life under the Guidelines that many of the crucial judgment calls in sentencing are
now made, not by the court, but by probation officers . . . "); see also John S.
Dierna, Guideline Sentencing: Probation Officer Responsibilities and
Interagency Issues, Fed. Prob., Sept. 1989, at 3. In the federal regime, probation
officers play a critical role as the court's independent investigator. Id. Probation
officers prepare all sections of the presentence report provided to the judge,
including the tentative advisory guideline range based on the information gathered
during the investigation. Id. See also Weinstein, supra note 127.
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predictability into the sentencing process.3 93 Yet, determining
whether the right call will be made with regard to the admission of
such evidence is anything but predictable.
Originally, circuit courts were split on the standard to determine
whether dismissed and uncharged conduct could affect
punishment.3 9 4 The Commission sought to clarify the role of this
type of sentencing evidence by amending the Guidelines to allow
courts to consider, without limitation, any information concerning
the defendant's background, character, and conduct.3 9 5 Specifically,
section 5K2.21 explicitly approved consideration of uncharged and
Circuits are now split regarding the
dismissed offenses. 3 9 6
relationship between such conduct and the sentencing offense. 3 9 7
Some circuits require a "meaningful relationship," while others
require no more than a "remote connection." 3 9 8

1 See Breyer, supra note 259; Erin A. Higginbotham, A Meaningless
Relationship: The Fifth Circuit's Use of Dismissed and Uncharged Conduct
Under the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 40 St. Mary's L.J. 267, 270-71 (2008).
394 Higginbotham, supra note 392, at 274-75. Originally, a majority of
courts allowed uncharged offenses to serve as the basis for upward departures if
prosecutors could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the conduct was
related to the underlying convictions. Id. at 280-81. A minority of courts allowed
consideration of uncharged offenses if doing so adequately reflected the
seriousness of the actual offense behavior. Id. at 277.
395
1d. at 275.
396 See id. at 275-76. The text of the amendment provides:

The court may depart upward to reflect the actual seriousness of the
offense based on conduct (1) underlying a charge dismissed as part of
a plea agreement in the case, or underlying a potential charge not
pursued in the case as part of a plea agreement or for any other reason;
and (2) that did not enter into the determination of the applicable
guideline range.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.21 (2013).
3

Higginbotham, supra note 392, at 281-82; compare United States v.

Newsom, 508 F.3d 731, 735 (5th Cir. 2007), United States v. Rogers, 423 F.3d
823, 828 (8th Cir. 2005), and United States v. Smith, 267 F. 3d 1154 (D.C. Cir.
2001), with United States v. Ellis, 419 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2005), and
United States v. Amirault, 224 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 2000).
398 Higginbotham, supra note 392, at 282-98. Conduct that is meaningfully
related "sheds further light on the true nature of the offense of conviction." Id. at
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Despite the serious implications of using uncharged or
dismissed conduct to increase a sentence, reliability is the current
standard to test the veracity and truth of such testimonial statements.
Crawford and Davis make clear that actual confrontation and crossexamination are the best methods to assess testimonial statements.
The fundamental unfairness and prejudice associated with punishing
a defendant based on un-cross-examined testimonial statements
about uncharged or dismissed conduct is no less compelling at
sentencing than at trial. For this reason, the Court should allow
cross-examination of testimonial statements related to all categories
of relevant conduct.
CONCLUSION

Whether the Confrontation Clause applies to testimonial
statements that are material to the issue of punishment is of utmost
importance, for an accurate determination of the facts that support
the punishment is primary to the integrity of the U.S. criminal justice
system. The text and structure of the Sixth Amendment reflects a
system of unitary prosecution. In the pre-founding felony cases,
judicial discretion did not exist to increase punishment based on
conduct proved by uncrossed statements. Criminal procedure in the
United States has taken sharp tums since the ratification of the Sixth
Amendment. In our modem system, the vast majority of felonies
are resolved by a plea of guilty, and as a matter of practice, few plea
agreements provide the factual details necessary to make qualitative
decisions about punishment.
Such decisions, as well as
considerations or judgments regarding a defendant's background
and character, are left to the discretion of the sentencing judge.
Punishing a defendant based on un-cross-examined testimonial
statements is fundamentally unfair and prejudicial.
Eliminating the "trial-right-only" theory of the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause creates uniformity with the
structurally identical Counsel and Jury Trial Clauses. The Court has
acknowledged that factual disputes are resolved at felony sentencing
hearings. To the extent that testimonial statements are material to

282. Even where there is a remote connection, the court is allowed to consider
unlimited information regarding a defendant's background. Id. at 283.
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resolution of factual disputes affecting punishment at felony
sentencing hearings, 3 9 9 cross-examination should be allowed in
order to assess the truth and veracity of such statements. To be sure,
confrontation should not be required for all evidence presented at
felony sentencing hearings. Two key factors when determining
whether to require cross-examination of testimonial statements at
felony sentencing are the statement's materiality to punishment and
whether cross-examination will assist in assessing truth and
veracity. Where both prongs of this inquiry are met, confrontation
should be expanded through sentencing.

399 See Klein, supra note 314, at 730-31 (noting increase in sentence length
post-Booker).
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